Assad’s Post-conflict Narratives: an Obstacle to Women’s Rights in Syria 

Temps de lecture : 10 minutes

Emma Beilouny

The Assad regime has been extremely vocal about its transition into a new chapter, a post-conflict era. This state propaganda is echoed by growing concerns that such post-conflict rhetoric will have huge downsides, especially for women. When looking at Syria’s recent cosmetic legal advancements in terms of women’s rights and their role in the regime’s post-conflict narratives, it appears clear that Syria is seeking to enforce its own performative transitional justice system onto the population and thus, stripping women from the opportunity of genuine gender-sensitive transitional justice.

Cosmetic women’s rights reforms to cover up years of abuse

In recent years, the Assad regime has undertaken a series of legal reforms, primarily focused in the penal, personal status, and nationality laws, aimed at improving the status of women. While these reforms could be regarded as significant and progressive steps toward gender equality, they fail to address the roots of inequalities and are merely cosmetic reforms[1]Syrians for Truth & Justice. (November 2021). How is Violence Against Women Written into Syrian Laws and Society? p. 12. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. … Continue reading. Syrian women have a long history of relative emancipation as well as social and economic security in comparison with other countries in the region, due in part to the universal social policies of the Ba’ath party in the sixties and seventies[2]Alsaba, A. and Anuj Kapilashrami. (2016). Understanding women’s experience of violence and the political economy of gender in conflict: the case of Syria. Reproductive Health Matters, 24:47, 5-17, … Continue reading. Yet, Syrian society and its public sphere remained “dominated by an old state bourgeoisie, religious orthodox elites, new corporate institutions, and militarised institutions hostile to and violent against women[3]Alsaba, A. and Anuj Kapilashrami. (2016). Understanding women’s experience of violence and the political economy of gender in conflict: the case of Syria, p. 7.”. Women’s legal and political status gradually grew in contradiction to Syria’s claims of modernity[4]Moghadam, V. M. (2013). Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers..

Whereas the Syrian Constitution of 2012 states that women and men are equal under the law, this equality is not reflected in ordinary laws, especially in personal and criminal laws. One of the most common forms of gender-based violence, domestic violence, is not explicitly mentioned in the Syrian Penal Code. Despite the Penal Code criminalizing beatings in general (Article 540: “hitting and harming”), the Syrian Personal Status Law allows the husband to hit his wife “lightly” (Article 305). The situation rapidly worsened during the civil war as the fundamental rights of Syrian women were violated on every level. The experiences of women were “shaped by [their] changing status, roles and social relations[5]Alsaba, A. and Anuj Kapilashrami. (2016). Understanding women’s experience of violence and the political economy of gender in conflict: the case of Syria, p. 9.”. Female-headed households increased from 4.4 to 12-17% between 2009 and 2015, “put[ing] women and girls in positions of reduced power” and thus increasing risks of gender-based violence[6]European Asylum Support office. (February 2020). Syria, Situation of Women. Country of Origin Information Report, p. 26. Retrieved on Frebruary 10, 2023. … Continue reading. Furthermore, several reports point the fact that “sexual violence has been considerably more common among GoS [Governement of Syria] forces and associated pro-government armed groups and that the GoS has used sexual violence as a strategic weapon of war[7]EASO. (February 2020). Syria, Situation of Women, p. 24.”. Whereas rape “was limited to individual cases” before 2011, the number of occurrences surged both as a consequence of the conflict context and because it had become a broader state-mandated war strategy[8]EASO. (February 2020). Syria, Situation of Women, p. 20.. According to a World Bank 2019 report, reported cases of rape against women had gone from 300 in 2011 to 6 000 in 2013[9]World Bank. (2020). The Mobility of Displaced Syrians, p. 78. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. … Continue reading.

Sexual violence was, and is still, highly prevalent in state prisons as the government arbitrarily detains and tortures both men and women. According to the UN Human Rights Council, since 2011, thousands of women and girls expressing anti-Government sentiments have been arrested, among them, many lawyers, journalists and activists[10]UN Human Rights Council. (2018, March 8).“I lost my dignity”: Sexual and gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, p. 9. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. … Continue reading. Sexual violence has been reported in ten different Syrian political and military intelligence services, including rape, forced nudity, humiliating treatments, torture, and violation of reproductive rights and medical care[11]Syria Justice and Accountability Centre. (January 2019). ‘Do you know what happens here?” An Analysis of Survivor Accounts of SGBV in Syria, pp. 8–10. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. … Continue reading. In extreme cases, “the perpetrators forced male relatives to engage in incestuous sexual intercourse with their female relatives, resulting in devastating psychological consequences for the victims[12]Al-Khatib, N., as cited in Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria, p. 90.”. Around 1.2 million people have been subjected to detention since 2011, with around 150,000 still detained and forcedly disappeared –mostly by the government–[13]Hill, N. (2022, April 8). Statement at the UN General Assembly Interim Oral Update with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation in the Syria. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. … Continue reading, and around 14,000 Syrian tortured to death[14]Syrian Network for Human Rights. (2019, October 2021). Documentation of 72 Torture Methods the Syrian Regime Continues to Practice in Its Detention Centers and Military Hospitals, p. 14. Retrieved on … Continue reading.

Paradoxically, the regime has been passing a series of progressive amendments, especially regarding women’s rights. In 2019, the Syrian People’s Assembly amended tens of articles of the Personal Status Law, raising the age of marriage from 17 to 18, allowing women over 18 to marry without their guardian’s approval, or allowing women to invalidate a non-consensual marriage, amongst others. The Syrian Constitution states in Article 23 that “the state shall provide women with all opportunities enabling them to effectively and fully contribute to the political, economic, social and cultural life, and the state shall work on removing the restrictions that prevent their development and participation in building society.” In parallel, Syria ratified the Convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 2003 but made several reservations –refused– on some articles, such as article 2, which seeks to prohibit discrimination against women[15]United Nations General Assembly. (1979). Convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. … Continue reading. Article 20 of the Constitution states that “the state shall protect and encourage marriage and shall work on removing material and social obstacles that hinder it. The state shall also protect maternity and childhood, take care of young children and youth and provide the suitable conditions for the development of their talents.” Yet, child marriages, one of the most common conflicts coping mechanisms, are not mentioned, even though Syria pledged in 2019 to draft an action plan designed to reduce early child marriages[16]At the 2019 Nairobi Summit on Population and Development ; UNHMRC. (2022, February 4). National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution … Continue reading. The reported numbers surged from 7% in 2011 to around 30% in 2015 while the World Bank estimates that 60% of child marriages remain unreported[17]EASO. (February 2020). Syria, Situation of Women, p. 24..

Even so, in the Syrian context, legislation alone does not mean enforcement. The lack of public services makes it extremely complicated for women to file complaints and benefit from legal aid, along with a profound distrust of legal mechanisms and numerous social and moral obstacles. For example, the war and subsequent economic sanctions imposed on Syria have made it almost impossible to seek help for domestic violence. Most shelters do not operate outside of Damascus, and even there, resources are limited[18]European Asylum Support Office. (November 2021). Country guidance: Syria, p. 116. Retrieved on Frebruary 10, 2023. https://easo.europa.eu/country-guidance-syria-2021. In the words of women’s rights advocate Lina AbiRafeh, “it’s those kinds of contexts where, even on a good day, there are hardly any systems, services and support. There isn’t enough legislation to protect women. And even if there is, it’s incomplete, it’s unapplied, it’s ignored[19]Beilouny, E. (2022, April 22). The Sanctions on Syria and Their Impact on Women. The Upstrem Journal. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://upstreamjournal.org/syriasanctions/”.

Unilateral transitional justice: whitewashing abuse, creating a national narrative and shif ting the blame

The government is using these recent performative women’s rights advancements to implement its own –fake– transitional justice mechanisms. In January 2022, Syria took part in its third Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a UN mechanism to examine a country’s human rights situation.[20]United Nations Human Rights Council. (2022). Universal Periodic Review Third Cycle – Syrian Arab Republic. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/sy-index For the Assad government, this was an opportunity to consolidate its legitimacy within the international community and to spread its own narrative of the situation on the ground[21]Bellintani, V. (2022, October 5). The Assad regime’s post-conflict narrative in the International Arena. TIMEP. Retrieved February 10, 2023. … Continue reading. The common thread of the report is that Syria is now entering its post-conflict phase.

The concept of post-conflict implemented by Syria is an illustration of its broader attempts to “hijack transitional justice and human rights languages for its own benefit[22]Bellintani, V. (2022, October 5). The Assad regime’s post-conflict narrative in the International Arena. TIMEP.” and even broader “disregard for the value of justice[23]El Bunni, A. (2020, November 24). Breaking new ground: Transitional justice in Syria. Brookings. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. … Continue reading”. Beyond the legislative measures mentioned above, a striking example is Assad’s effort to create an oral history archive of the conflict through the Watan Document foundation (led by Assad’s personal media advisor Bouthaina Shaaban[24]Üngör, U., U. (2019, June 7). Narrative War is Coming. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://aljumhuriya.net/en/2019/06/07/narrative-war-coming/ and thus, its own national narratives. Even though the regime was the main perpetrator of war crimes, Assad is trying to be seen as providing reparations while shifting the blame on rebel and terrorist groups “rather than implementing a real and genuine transitional justice process[25]Bellintani, V. (2022, October 5). The Assad regime’s post-conflict narrative in the International Arena. TIMEP.”. 

For women who faced state-mandated torture in detainment, reintegration in society is impeded by PTSD, shame and stigma, lack of medical and psychological resources. And Syria’s March 2022 anti-torture law complying with the UN Convention against Torture[26]Amnesty International. (2022, March 31). Syria: New anti-torture law “whitewashes” decades of human rights violations. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. … Continue reading and the Legislative Decree granting a general amnesty for some “crimes of terrorism[27]Syrian Arab Republic. (2022). Legislative Decree No. 7 of 2022. http://www.parliament.gov.sy/arabic/index.php?node=201&nid=22968”, will not give these women the reparations they need. Nor will it make up for the fact that Syria is still refusing to allow UN-mandated investigations of its prisons[28]Amnesty International. (n. d.). End the Horror in Syria’s Torture Prisons. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/08/syria-torture-prisons/ and still denies the mere existence of political prisoners[29]Hamrawi, I. (2022, June 10). Bashar al-Assad: We do not have what is called a political prisoner. Rozana. Retrieved on February 10, 2023.. “We don’t have a torture policy in Syria,” said Bashar Al-Assad when asked about Branch 251, the regime’s torture unit, in a 2019 interview[30]Syrian CH News. (2019, Nov 19). President al-Assad’s interview with RT International.  https://youtu.be/Jn6O0WA1HsQ.

Gender-sensitive transitional justice

To be effective and put an end to decades-long impunity, transitional justice must be victim-sensitive, and it cannot come from those who have committed –and continue to commit– war crimes and crimes against humanity[31]Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria. The Day After. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. … Continue reading. Gender-sensitive transitional justice stems from “the realization that the personal is political, and that the reason for gender-based violence is power, authority and control of resources in families, society and institutions, and that the division of public space into a ‘private space’ and a ‘public space’ is an imaginary division intended to consolidate the structure of male domination[32]Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria, p. 36”. Although radical change is not what is to be expected of the available transitional justice mechanisms, the goal is to provide civil society and women’s rights movements with the legal tools to achieve gender equality in development, policymaking, institution and legislation[33]Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria, p. 36..

And, of course, the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms in Syria raises difficult questions: “how can an executioner pardon his victim? How can the illusionist tell the truth?[34]AlMustafa, M. (2022, August 8). Assad’s Illusion of Amnesty. TIMEP. Retrieved on February 10, 2022. https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/assads-illusion-of-amnesty/”  As the Syrian conflict—and Assad’s regime crimes and abuses—has been one of the most documented in history, can transitional justice be achieved without political transition[35]Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria, p. 15?

Post-conflict rhetoric will not make women safe

The risk is thus that, by implementing post-conflict rhetoric as a normalization tool and nationalizing peace processes, the Assad regime will manage to turn the international community’s attention away from the root cause of its women’s rights violations and will strip women’s rights movements from their chance at genuine and reparative justice[36]Bellintani, V. (2022, October 5). The Assad regime’s post-conflict narrative in the International Arena. TIMEP.

Real and lasting peace cannot happen without the active participation of women, including increased political representation and a genuine commitment to legislative measures geared toward gender equality. For Syrian politician and activist Lama Kannout, active participation of women is even more important in the sphere of transitional justice where, “without women’s participation, their perceptions, experiences and entitlements, and response to their rights and needs, transitional justice would reflect only the views, priorities and experiences of men regarding violence[37]Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria, p. 3.”. Active participation of women in the peace process makes it 64% less likely to fail and 35% more likely to last 15 years, but since 1990, only 2% of mediators and 8% are negotiators are women[38]Bigio, J. (2018, November 19). Women and the Syrian Peace Process: A Conversation with Mariam Jalabi. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. … Continue reading.

For Mariam Jalabi, the co-founder of the Syrian Women’s Political Movement (SWPM), inclusion on the national level in pre-existing political institutions can sometimes be counter-productive, “in practice, we found that this further marginalized women because they may be consulted, but they’re not sitting at the table. They’re actually not even in the room. They’re only involved in ways men define[39]Bigio, J. (2018, November 19). Women and the Syrian Peace Process.”. These effects can even be found at the international level. Jalabi gives the example of the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board (created in 2016 to address the lack of women in negotiations in Syria but later dissolved), where women were considered an homogeneous group capable of generating effective solutions regardless of their different political opinions. What Jalabi found is that “mostly, this was a mistake because it made women just advisors[40]Bigio, J. (2018, November 19). Women and the Syrian Peace Process.”.

Still, despite a decade of destruction and pervasive economic sanctions, the amount of grass-root civil society initiatives soared, many of them women-led (women’s organizations are usually decimated during civil wars[41]Goetz, A., Jenkins, R. (2016). “Agency and Accountability: Promoting Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding”, Feminist Economics, Vol. 22 (N. 1), 211-236. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. … Continue reading. In a way, the conflict has given women momentum; in Jalabi’s words: “we are coming together as women (…) because we want a solution for our country. We want to find a way to protect our citizens, our people, and create a space that respects everybody equally under the law, where everybody has equal citizenship[42]Bigio, J. (2018, November 19). Women and the Syrian Peace Process.”. Indeed, many of these organizations have taken on the responsibilities of recovery, relief, and documentation of violence[43]WILPF et al. (2013, December 28). Ensuring the Effective Participation and Rights of Women in the Syrian Peace and Mediation Process, … Continue reading. These types of organizations are fundamental when it comes to rebuilding communities and reconciling social and political spheres while considering gender equality[44]WILPF et al. (2013, December 28). Ensuring the Effective Participation and Rights of Women, p.1.. But again, they are mainly absent from the international processes and discussions, even though “their perspectives and contributions are essential to any effort to end the violence and promote a sustainable resolution and just and democratic peace[45]WILPF et al. (2013, December 28). Ensuring the Effective Participation and Rights of Women, p.1.”.

Despite the obstacles in pursuing transitional justice in Syria (the possibility of political deadlock and the limitations of traditional mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court), Syrians sought universal jurisdiction in European countries to start the process while the conflict was ongoing. It is critical that these efforts continue. To hold the Syrian regime accountable, in the hope that, in the end, Syria will not follow a path in which the criminals find themselves the judges of their own crimes[46]El Bunni, A. (2020, November 24). Breaking new ground. Brookings.. But also to pave the way for a more equitable and just future for all Syrians, and especially women. As the conflict has disproportionately affected women, it is essential that any effort toward rebuilding and reparations fully include their voices and experiences.

To quote this article: BEILOUNY Emma, “Assad’s Post-conflict Narratives: an Obstacle to Women’s Rights in Syria, (04/04/23), Gender in Gepolitics Institute, https://igg-geo.org/?p=12152&lang=en. 

The statements in this article are the sole responsibility of the author.

References

References
1 Syrians for Truth & Justice. (November 2021). How is Violence Against Women Written into Syrian Laws and Society? p. 12. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://stj-sy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Violence-Against-Women-in-Syrian-Law-.pdf
2 Alsaba, A. and Anuj Kapilashrami. (2016). Understanding women’s experience of violence and the political economy of gender in conflict: the case of Syria. Reproductive Health Matters, 24:47, 5-17, p. 7. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. DOI: 10.1016/j.rhm.2016.05.002
3 Alsaba, A. and Anuj Kapilashrami. (2016). Understanding women’s experience of violence and the political economy of gender in conflict: the case of Syria, p. 7.
4 Moghadam, V. M. (2013). Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
5 Alsaba, A. and Anuj Kapilashrami. (2016). Understanding women’s experience of violence and the political economy of gender in conflict: the case of Syria, p. 9.
6 European Asylum Support office. (February 2020). Syria, Situation of Women. Country of Origin Information Report, p. 26. Retrieved on Frebruary 10, 2023. https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/02_2020_EASO_COI_Report_Syria_Situation_of_women.pdf
7 EASO. (February 2020). Syria, Situation of Women, p. 24.
8 EASO. (February 2020). Syria, Situation of Women, p. 20.
9 World Bank. (2020). The Mobility of Displaced Syrians, p. 78. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/551681579156620771/pdf/The-Mobility-of-Displaced-Syrians-An-Economic-and-Social-Analysis.pdf
10 UN Human Rights Council. (2018, March 8).“I lost my dignity”: Sexual and gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, p. 9. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-37-CRP-3.pdf
11 Syria Justice and Accountability Centre. (January 2019). ‘Do you know what happens here?” An Analysis of Survivor Accounts of SGBV in Syria, pp. 8–10. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://syriaaccountability.org/content/files/2022/04/SGBV-report.pdf ; UNHRC. (2018, March 8). “I lost my dignity”: Sexual and gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, pp. 10, 11–12.
12 Al-Khatib, N., as cited in Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria, p. 90.
13 Hill, N. (2022, April 8). Statement at the UN General Assembly Interim Oral Update with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation in the Syria. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://usun.usmission.gov/statement-at-the-un-general-assembly-interim-oral-update-with-the-un-high-commissioner-for-human-rights-on-the-situation-in-the-syria/
14 Syrian Network for Human Rights. (2019, October 2021). Documentation of 72 Torture Methods the Syrian Regime Continues to Practice in Its Detention Centers and Military Hospitals, p. 14. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/Documentation_of_72_Torture_Methods_the_Syrian_Regime_Continues_to_Practice_in_Its_Detention_Centers_and_Military_Hospitals_en.pdf
15 United Nations General Assembly. (1979). Convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-elimination-all-forms-discrimination-against-women
16 At the 2019 Nairobi Summit on Population and Development ; UNHMRC. (2022, February 4). National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1* Syrian Arab Republic, p. 19. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/338/40/PDF/G2133840.pdf?OpenElement
17 EASO. (February 2020). Syria, Situation of Women, p. 24.
18 European Asylum Support Office. (November 2021). Country guidance: Syria, p. 116. Retrieved on Frebruary 10, 2023. https://easo.europa.eu/country-guidance-syria-2021
19 Beilouny, E. (2022, April 22). The Sanctions on Syria and Their Impact on Women. The Upstrem Journal. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://upstreamjournal.org/syriasanctions/
20 United Nations Human Rights Council. (2022). Universal Periodic Review Third Cycle – Syrian Arab Republic. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/sy-index
21 Bellintani, V. (2022, October 5). The Assad regime’s post-conflict narrative in the International Arena. TIMEP. Retrieved February 10, 2023. https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/the-assad-regimes-post-conflict-narrative-in-the-international-arena/
22, 25, 36 Bellintani, V. (2022, October 5). The Assad regime’s post-conflict narrative in the International Arena. TIMEP.
23 El Bunni, A. (2020, November 24). Breaking new ground: Transitional justice in Syria. Brookings. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/breaking-new-ground-transitional-justice-in-syria/
24 Üngör, U., U. (2019, June 7). Narrative War is Coming. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://aljumhuriya.net/en/2019/06/07/narrative-war-coming/
26 Amnesty International. (2022, March 31). Syria: New anti-torture law “whitewashes” decades of human rights violations. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/syria-new-anti-torture-law-whitewashes-decades-of-human-rights-violations/
27 Syrian Arab Republic. (2022). Legislative Decree No. 7 of 2022. http://www.parliament.gov.sy/arabic/index.php?node=201&nid=22968
28 Amnesty International. (n. d.). End the Horror in Syria’s Torture Prisons. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/08/syria-torture-prisons/
29 Hamrawi, I. (2022, June 10). Bashar al-Assad: We do not have what is called a political prisoner. Rozana. Retrieved on February 10, 2023.
30 Syrian CH News. (2019, Nov 19). President al-Assad’s interview with RT International.  https://youtu.be/Jn6O0WA1HsQ
31 Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria. The Day After. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://tda-sy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Gender-Sensitive-Transitional-Justice-in-Syria.pdf
32 Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria, p. 36
33 Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria, p. 36.
34 AlMustafa, M. (2022, August 8). Assad’s Illusion of Amnesty. TIMEP. Retrieved on February 10, 2022. https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/assads-illusion-of-amnesty/
35 Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria, p. 15
37 Kannout, L. (September 2019). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria, p. 3.
38 Bigio, J. (2018, November 19). Women and the Syrian Peace Process: A Conversation with Mariam Jalabi. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/blog/women-and-syrian-peace-process-conversation-mariam-jalabi
39 Bigio, J. (2018, November 19). Women and the Syrian Peace Process.
40, 42 Bigio, J. (2018, November 19). Women and the Syrian Peace Process.
41 Goetz, A., Jenkins, R. (2016). “Agency and Accountability: Promoting Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding”, Feminist Economics, Vol. 22 (N. 1), 211-236. Retrieved on February 10, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2015.1086012
43 WILPF et al. (2013, December 28). Ensuring the Effective Participation and Rights of Women in the Syrian Peace and Mediation Process, p.1.https://wilpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Ensuring-the-Effective-Participation-and-Rights-of-Women-in-the-Syrian-Peace-and-Mediation-Process_final.pdf
44 WILPF et al. (2013, December 28). Ensuring the Effective Participation and Rights of Women, p.1.
45 WILPF et al. (2013, December 28). Ensuring the Effective Participation and Rights of Women, p.1.
46 El Bunni, A. (2020, November 24). Breaking new ground. Brookings.