Hegemonic Masculinity in the Context of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict

Reading Time: 14 minutes

Written by: Mathilde Verrier

Translated by: Caroline Bocquet

Published on: 26/11/2025

The war between Russia and Ukraine has been ongoing for several years and escalated significantly in February 2022 with the Russian army’s full-scale invasion of Ukrainian territory. Rooted in the legacy of Soviet rule across much of Eastern Europe, the conflict unfolds within a distinct political and social landscape. In this confrontation between two nation-states, the war deeply intertwines representations of gender and power and makes them central to its legitimisation. The figure of Russian President Vladimir Putin is particularly revealing in this regard, as it exemplifies the connection between authoritarian masculinity and the preservation of power through performances of virility. In contrast, his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, embodies a narrative of resistance and masculine self-sacrifice in defence of the homeland. Although these two political leaders stand diametrically opposed in the foundations of their presidential power, they nevertheless operate within the same gendered framework: that of heroic masculinity.

Throughout history, wars and armed conflicts have represented moments of rupture that profoundly reshape social structures. Situations marked by violence and insecurity exacerbate gender norms, particularly those associated with virility, protection, and heroism. In their 2025 academic article,[1]Baker, P., & Brookes, G. (2025), Masculinities and language. Polity Press https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/99318/9781040325636.pdf Paul Baker, Professor of English at Lancaster University and Editor-in-Chief of the journal Corpora, and Gavin Brookes, a researcher in the Department of Linguistics and English at Lancaster University, offer a clear definition of hegemonic masculinity. According to the authors, “hegemonic masculinity refers to the valorisation of certain forms of masculinity as powerful, the subordination or marginalisation of other forms, and the means by which this is achieved through the complicity of even those who do not necessarily benefit from it”.[2]Baker, P., & Brookes, G. (2025). Masculinities and language. Polity Press. https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/99318/9781040325636.pdf?sequence=1

The forms of masculinity discussed in their analysis draw on the work of Raewyn Connell, the Australian sociologist recognised for introducing the concept of masculinity into gender studies and sociology more broadly. In 2014, Meoïn Hagège and Arthur Vuattoux published an analytical critique of Connell’s work, titled: Masculinités : enjeux sociaux de l’hégémonie“,[3]Hagège, M., & Vuattoux, A. (2015), Compte rendu du livre Masculinités. Enjeux sociaux de l’hégémonie, par R. Connell,. Politix, 109(1), pp. 170-172 https://doi.org/10.3917/pox.109.0170 which revisits several of the concepts developed in Connell’s landmark book Masculinities. In this critique,[4]Hagège, M., & Vuattoux, A. (2015), Compte rendu du livre Masculinités. Enjeux sociaux de l’hégémonie, par R. Connell,. Politix, 109(1), pp. 170-172. https://doi.org/10.3917/pox.109.0170 hegemonic masculinity is defined not as a “fixed and unchanging personality type” or a dominant “system” but as “the form of masculinity that holds a hegemonic position within a given structure of gender relations—a position that remains open to contestation”.[5]Hagège, M., & Vuattoux, A. (2015), Compte rendu du livre Masculinités. Enjeux sociaux de l’hégémonie, par R. Connell,. Politix, 109(1), p.172 https://doi.org/10.3917/pox.109.0170

This conceptual clarification invites further reflection on how hegemonic masculinity is expressed and reconfigured in times of war. To explore this question, this article focuses on one of the most extensively covered conflicts of recent years: the Russia–Ukraine war. It therefore seeks to answer the following question: How does the Russia–Ukraine conflict reveal the mechanisms through which hegemonic masculinity is constructed and redefined in a wartime context?

Although these scholars, and Raewyn Connell in particular, have also identified other forms of masculinity—including complicit, subordinate, and marginalised masculinities—this article deliberately concentrates on hegemonic masculinity and the ways in which it intensifies during periods of armed conflict. For this reason, masculinity will primarily be examined here in the singular rather than the plural. 

Hegemonic Masculinity and the Reinforcement of Militarisation

A significant body of scholarship has examined the rise in gender inequalities during periods of conflict, particularly regarding women and gender minorities. However, relatively little research has explored the relationship between hegemonic masculinity and armed conflict. For Cynthia Enloe, American feminist political scientist, the connection between militarism and the reinforcement of gender stereotypes is a gendered, cultural, and political process. Within such a process, a society comes to place paramount value on military behaviours and ideas, elevating the institutions that uphold them above all others. Where the term implies a particular conception of masculinity, it is hegemonic masculinity that the state, the country, or the group promotes as its dominant model.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict can be viewed as a conventional war: soldiers conscripted by both governments are fighting across multiple fronts and heavily armed. The issue at stake is not only the militarisation of the armed forces but also the broader evolution of militarism in Russian and Ukrainian societies. As Cynthia Cockburn writes in From Where We Stand: War, Women’s Activism and Feminist Analysis (2007), “masculinity shapes war and war shapes masculinity”.[6]Cockburn, C (2007). From Where We Stand: War, Women’s Activism and Feminist Analysis. London, UK: Zed Books, p. 249 Values directly associated with war, violence, and masculinity become embedded as social norms, reinforcing pre-existing patriarchal structures and increasing the vulnerability of gender minorities. Militarisation can be defined as the process through which military principles become integrated into society, strengthening the role of the armed forces as well as ideals of virility, strength, and power.[7]Joana, J.  (2012). Chapitre 1 / La militarisation de la guerre. Les armées contemporaines (p. 21-69). Presses de Sciences Po. … Continue reading Supported by the state, this process is reflected in increased security spending and the expansion of military capabilities, thereby reinforcing gender stereotypes associated with masculinity. In Ukraine, this rise in military expenditure has intensified since the beginning of the Russian invasion, although it can already be traced back to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.[8]Jacqmin, D. (2018, 29 mai). L’industrie de défense ukrainienne : un pied en URSS, l’autre dans l’OTAN, GRIP, p. 8 … Continue reading

In contemporary Russia, dominant masculinity is closely tied to the celebration of military values: strength, discipline, national loyalty, and the rejection of weakness, the latter often associated with femininity or the liberal West. Official discourse frequently contrasts the protective virility of Russian soldiers with the alleged weakness or moral “degeneracy” of the enemy, often linked to liberal Western values, so-called “LGBT propaganda”, or non-conforming forms of masculinity. In a 2022 presidential speech, Vladimir Putin stated that Western countries were embracing “strange and fashionable ideas such as dozens of genders or gay pride parades. Let them do what they want. But they certainly have no right to tell others to follow in their footsteps”.[9]Putin, V. (2022, October 27). Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Kremlin.ru. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69695 Putin has also claimed that same-sex marriage leads to paedophilia and constitutes a form of perversion.[10]Putin, V.. (2023, February 21). Address to the Federal Assembly. ASTRID-online. https://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/puti/putin-21-2-23.pdf His misogyny[11]Libération. (2014, 5 juin). Quel est le degré de sexisme de Poutine ?  https://www.liberation.fr/france/2014/06/05/trierweiler-heureuse-de-ne-pas-avoir-a-serrer-la-main-de-poutine_1033927/ and performative virility are further illustrated by the following examples. Referring to Hillary Clinton, former candidate in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Putin declared, “It is better not to argue with women […] But perhaps weakness is not the worst characteristic for a woman”.[12]Libération. (2014, 5 juin). Quel est le degré de sexisme de Poutine ?  https://www.liberation.fr/france/2014/06/05/trierweiler-heureuse-de-ne-pas-avoir-a-serrer-la-main-de-poutine_1033927/ 

In March 2022, he addressed his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, with the following remark: “Like it or don’t like it, my beauty, you’ll have to put up with it”.[13]Télérama. (2022, 6 mars). Guerre en Ukraine: à l’origine du conflit, la masculinité … Continue reading Through such rhetoric, Vladimir Putin associates his contempt for women with his contempt for men he perceives as weak — as in the case of Volodymyr Zelensky — while elevating his own model of masculinity as the norm of political authority. In this framework, the hegemonic masculinity promoted by Putin demeans other men by comparing them to women, whom he portrays as the ultimate embodiment of weakness, inferiority, and submission. His sexist rhetoric draws directly from the language of gender-based violence. Marginalised, complicit, and stigmatised masculinities (concepts central to masculinity studies) are therefore actively persecuted by the Russian president.[14]Demetriou, D. Z. (2015). La masculinité hégémonique : lecture critique d’un concept de Raewyn Connell (H. Bouvard, trad.). Genre, sexualité & société, (13), 21–22. … Continue reading This ideological opposition serves not only to legitimise military aggression but also to reaffirm a patriarchal and nationalist social order, two societal models that remain deeply interconnected.[15]Naves, M.-C. (2019, 30 avril). Pour les populistes nationalistes, l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes remet en cause un ordre établi. IRIS. … Continue reading

Between Commitment and Military Mobilisation: Masculinity in Orbit

Since the 2000s, Vladimir Putin’s regime has relied heavily on virile and militarised imagery to consolidate its authority. The Russian President himself embodies a militarised, hypermasculine persona. The representation of Putin’s body has become a political tool used to disseminate and embody his vision of masculinity, as illustrated by widely circulated photographs of him fishing in Siberia or posing shirtless in the mountains.[16]RTL. (2017, 5 août). VIDÉO – Vladimir Poutine bronze et pêche dans les eaux du lac Baïkal en Sibérie. … Continue reading These images demonstrate how male bodies can be instrumentalised to reinforce political power and project ideals of strength and heroism, while simultaneously devaluing alternative forms of masculinity. Such scenes — involving hunting, combat sports, or military leadership — reinforce the symbolic association between political authority and warrior-like virility.[17]Sperling, V. (2014, 5 décembre). « Happy Birthday, Mr. Putin! »: celebrating political masculinity in Russia. OUPblog. https://blog.oup.com/2014/12/putin-political-masculinity-russia/

In Russia, all men of fighting age, regardless of their social background, have effectively become targets of the mobilisation policies that Putin and the Ministry of Defence have implemented. In this wartime context, the idea that men can embody only one acceptable form of masculinity becomes increasingly entrenched: men exist primarily as soldiers tasked with defending the nation. Historically, Russian women “have never been particularly celebrated as heroines in times of war”[18]Trisko Darden, J. (2024, March). Russian women in the face of war with Ukraine. Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). … Continue reading while Russian culture has long been “built around male authority.”[19]Trisko Darden, J. (2024, March). Russian women in the face of war with Ukraine. Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). … Continue reading

In a 2024 report, CNBC documented masculinist slogans appearing on Russian television, such as “You are a real man. Be one” and “A man’s life is a choice”.[20]CNBC. (2023, 24 avril). “Be a real man,” Russia looks to recruit fighters for Ukraine war. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/24/be-a-real-man-russia-looks-to-recruit-fighters-for-ukraine-war.html

These slogans reveal the broader mechanisms of recruitment, appealing directly to men’s egos and sense of patriotic duty. They illustrate how Russian mobilisation strategically draws on the imagery of toxic masculinity by glorifying virility and patriotism to maximise enlistment. Because ministries such as the Ministry of Defence are directly involved in these mobilisation campaigns, hegemonic masculinity in Russia is promoted and institutionalised on a national scale. 

On the Ukrainian side, mobilisation follows a markedly different logic. Contract-based enlistment is encouraged through national campaigns that allow volunteers to choose both their military unit and their area of specialisation. The objective is to adapt mobilisation to each individual’s skills and capacities. In this regard, the mobilisation of Ukrainian soldiers appears more contemporary than that of its Russian counterpart. The Rezerv+ app[21]VisitUkraine.Today. (2024, 17 mai). “Reserve+: the Ministry of Defence showed an application where military conscripts will be able to update their data.” VisitUkraine.Today. … Continue reading was created to facilitate military registration and mobilisation, although its design and use remain debatable. Nevertheless, it reflects a broader effort to make military service more accessible to a larger segment of the population. Ukraine’s strategy primarily emphasises patriotism and national unity, promoting the idea of a unified armed force regardless of gender. Recruitment policies have also evolved through the introduction of a new contract campaign entitled “The Generation That Decides Now”[22]Le Monde. (2025, 15 février). Ukraine offers one-year army contract for 18-24-year-olds. Le Monde. … Continue reading, designed to broaden access to mobilisation and encourage participation among younger generations.[23]Le Monde. (2025, 15 février). Ukraine offers one-year army contract for 18-24-year-olds. Le Monde. … Continue reading

In Ukraine, militarism is actively supported by the government, which, following the Russian invasion in February 2022, has been compelled to reinforce its defence and military strategies. Zelensky has repeatedly praised the resilience of the Ukrainian people and acknowledged their wartime efforts. On the anniversary of the invasion in February 2023, he declared on his Telegram channel, “And today, we have been standing strong for exactly one year. And we still know this: we must fight for every tomorrow!”[24]“Full speech on anniversary of full-scale Russian invasion by Ukraine president Zelenskyy” (2023, 24 février). … Continue reading; He also stated, “At the same time, the world has seen what Ukraine is capable of. These are new heroes. Defenders of Kyiv, defenders of Azovstal”.[25]Al Jazeera. (2023, 20 septembre). “Full text : Zelenskyy’s speech to the UN General Assembly” Al Jazeera In September 2023, while addressing the members of the United Nations, Zelensky declared, “Let unity decide everything openly.” While Russia is pushing the world toward a final war, Ukraine is doing everything to ensure that after the Russian aggression, no one in the world will dare to attack another nation”.[26]Al Jazeera. (2023, 20 septembre). “Full text: Zelenskyy’s speech to the UN General Assembly” Al Jazeera. … Continue reading

By portraying Ukraine as resilient and courageous, Zelensky also positions the country as a protective barrier between Europe and Putin’s expansionist policies. These speeches reveal his determination to confront an enemy threatening not only Ukrainian territory and borders but also the democratic functioning of Ukrainian society itself.

Another illustration of Ukraine’s contemporary mobilisation strategy is the launch of the nation-branding campaign “Bravery to Be Ukraine”.[27]L’agence publicitaire Banda, basée à Kyiv et Los Angeles, a mis en œuvre cette initiative via affichages, vidéos, autocollants, et même produits de consommation, à la fois en Ukraine et à … Continue reading[28]Kaneva, N. (2022, 21 août With bravery as a new brand, advertising has become a ‘weapon of war’ for Ukraine. Business Standard. Through this campaign, Ukraine aims to foster national unity and appeal to the courage and commitment of all its citizens. In contrast, Russian mobilisation remains primarily directed toward men. According to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “In March 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defence noted that 1,100 women were participating in combat operations in Ukraine (less than half of the estimated 360,000 to 410,000 Russian troops deployed in Ukraine in 2023)”.[29]Trisko Darden, J. (2024, March). Russian women in the face of war with Ukraine. Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). … Continue reading Although women are also mobilised in Russia, Putin and his government continue to prioritise masculine strength and virility over the capabilities of female citizens, who themselves are often direct victims of soldiers.[30]Trisko Darden, J. (2024, March). Russian women in the face of war with Ukraine. Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). … Continue reading This significant contrast in wartime mobilisation reflects the fundamentally different approaches to gender held by the two states. 

The Embodiment of Hegemonic Masculinity in Figures of Power

Many conflicts are rooted in processes of patriarchal construction that are deeply embedded in political and military institutions. The predominance of men in decision-making spheres contributes to the establishment of what can be described as a patriarchy of power[31]Demetriou, D. Z. (2015). La masculinité hégémonique : lecture critique d’un concept de Raewyn Connell (H. Bouvard, trad.). Genre, sexualité & société, (13), pp. 337-361 … Continue readingwhich progressively shapes society as a whole.

This influence extends well beyond institutions themselves, as the broader social order is structured around the promotion of an authoritarian and virile masculine ideal embodied in the figure of the “strongman”. This figure does not necessarily rely solely on formal institutional or military authority but rather on significant symbolic, political, and social power. The “strongman” archetype is rooted in heteronormative ideals such as physical strength, self-confidence, exaggerated virility, and control — traits often perceived as natural and legitimate across many cultures.[32]Le 1 Hebdo. (2025, 16 avril). Qu’est-ce qu’être un homme ? Le 1 Hebdo, (541).

The strongman figure is therefore both a product and a driving force of hegemonic masculinity. It relies on a narrow understanding of strength and virility — associated with heroism, determination, body hair, and a commanding presence — to impose an authoritarian model of power. The relationship between this virile construction and authoritarian political systems is direct: by embodying a powerful and often brutal form of masculinity, political legitimacy is reinforced, sometimes at the expense of civil liberties and fundamental rights. The political figures of Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky may, in several respects, be compared. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, both have become powerful symbols of their respective nations and central figures on the international stage. Yet their political positioning, media representations, and gendered performances are rooted in radically different logics.

On the one hand, Vladimir Putin embodies the archetype of a “strongman.” Over the course of his presidency, he has carefully cultivated and maintained an image of authoritarian, dominant, and virile masculinity through repeated sexist and homophobic actions and statements, as previously discussed.[33]Le Monde. (2024, 22 mars). La Russie ajoute le mouvement international LGBT à sa liste des « terroristes et extrémistes ». … Continue reading His relationship to masculinity is also reflected in his foreign policy: aggressive, expansionist, and nostalgic for Soviet imperial grandeur; it demonstrates a form of power politics grounded in conservative and patriarchal values. On the other hand, Volodymyr Zelensky, a former actor turned head of state, presents himself primarily as a defender of democracy and of the Ukrainian people in the face of Russian aggression.[34]Courrier International. (s.d.). Verbatim. Prédateur, crétins… échange d’amabilités entre Zelensky et Poutine. … Continue reading[35]Le Grand Continent. (s.d.). Violences impériales. L’actualité russe du passé soviétique.https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/themes/histoire/violences-imperiales-lactualite-russe-du-passe-sovietique/

Since February 2022, he has emerged as a determined and internationally recognised wartime leader. However, he is not generally associated with the “strongman” archetype as conceptualised in studies of hegemonic masculinity. International media and most European academic analyses do not describe him in these terms. Rather, his legitimacy rests on courage, proximity to citizens, and his capacity to embody democratic values, rather than on overt displays of virile dominance.[36]Télérama. (2022, 6 mars). Guerre en Ukraine : à l’origine du conflit, la masculinité … Continue reading

Ultimately, while both men occupy the same political office, the forms of masculinity they embody differ profoundly, and their political visions reflect this divergence. Putin personifies an authoritarian form of hegemonic masculinity, whereas Zelensky distances himself from this model by promoting a more horizontal and democratic style of leadership. This contrast reveals two opposing conceptions of power: one rooted in force and the domination of minorities; the other in resistance and the defence of popular sovereignty.

Patriotism, Nationalism, or the Ideal of the Engaged Citizen?

In the context of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, President Volodymyr Zelensky has emerged as an iconic embodiment of the citizen-soldier. The figure of the citizen-soldier deserves particular attention within the study of masculinities in wartime contexts. It refers to the ideal of an individual who is fully integrated into society, actively engaged in political life, and prepared to take up arms, if necessary, in defence of the community.[37]Paché, S., & Crémieux-Labail, R. (éds.). (2022). Défendre la France : le temps des soldats-citoyens et la défaite du citoyen-soldat (Presses universitaires de Rennes). … Continue reading

Historically valorised since antiquity, this social expectation rests on a balance between civic engagement and military responsibility. The citizen-soldier does not seek domination but rather acts on behalf of the collective within a legitimate institutional framework. The soldier role assigned to the citizen therefore confers upon him the responsibility of defending the nation against an enemy, embodying the connection between hegemonic masculinity and commitment to one’s people. Both Ukraine and Russia promote this form of hegemonic masculinity, as it serves the interests of the nation during wartime.  

As first citizen of his state,[38]Saint Maurice, T. de (2023). Serviteur du Peuple. Un président peut en cacher un autre. Dans S. Laugier (Dir.), Les séries, laboratoire d’éveil politique. CNRS Éditions. … Continue reading President Zelensky bears a dual responsibility: governing and protecting. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion in February 2022, he has consistently embodied this democratic and martial ideal, presenting himself simultaneously as a wartime leader and a representative of the people. Moreover, Zelensky almost always appears dressed in combat fatigues, in contrast to Vladimir Putin, who is generally portrayed wearing luxury suits.[39]Le Monde. (2022, 12 juillet). Le tee-shirt kaki de Volodymyr Zelensky, reflet d’une com’ très maîtrisée. … Continue reading

Since 2022, Zelensky has repeatedly visited the front lines[40]France 24. (2024, 29 juillet). En Ukraine, Zelensky visite ses troupes sur le front et Moscou dit avancer à l’Est. … Continue reading[41]L’Orient-Le Jour. (2024, 12 décembre). Zelensky dit visiter ses troupes près de la ligne du front dans le sud de l’Ukraine. … Continue reading to meet the Ukrainian armed forces, sharing the risks and exhaustion that soldiers face. Through this commitment, he reinforces his authority through proximity, sacrifice, and solidarity. His image is not built upon conquering masculinity or hierarchical domination, but rather upon moral legitimacy and the exemplary fulfilment of duty.

In Ukraine, the citizen-soldier model is actively promoted by political authorities as a collective ideal of resistance, while remaining strongly tied to the pursuit of a diplomatic solution to the conflict that is devastating the country. In this regard, the work of photographer Adrien Vautier and journalist Emmanuel Grynszpan constitutes a major source of analysis. Both documented the daily lives of Ukrainian soldiers in Kurakhove, one of the most dangerous areas of the conflict.[42]d’Istria, T. (2024, 11 décembre). Sur le front ukrainien, les soldats épuisés se battent sans répit. Le Monde. … Continue reading There, they observed extreme exhaustion and exceptionally intense combat conditions. Yet what emerges most strongly from their reporting is a profound “sense of duty”[43]d’Istria, T. (2024, 11 décembre). Sur le front ukrainien, les soldats épuisés se battent sans répit. Le Monde. … Continue reading phared among the fighters. This notion of duty directly reflects the ethos of the citizen-soldier, of which Volodymyr Zelensky has become one of the most prominent international symbols today.[44]d’Istria, T. (2024, 11 décembre). Sur le front ukrainien, les soldats épuisés se battent sans répit. Le Monde. … Continue reading

The photographic work of Adrien Vautier[45]Vautier, A. (2022-2024). Si tu traverses l’hiver. Deux années de guerre en Ukraine. 2022-2024. https://www.adrienvautier.com/guerre-en-ukraine-2022#1 and the testimonies collected by Emmanuel Grynszpan reveal a dual dynamic: war requires combatants, sometimes untrained, but mobilised by an ‘obligation’ toward their homeland. Heads of state require soldiers on the front lines, and to secure them, they must mobilise the population. In both Ukraine and Russia, the ideal of the citizen-soldier committed to protecting national territory and civilian populations therefore actively instrumentalises itself. This figure of the citizen-soldier is cultivated, exploited, and mobilised in support of a broader agenda: strengthening the military as a strong, virile, and powerful sector. In other words, it reinforces all the characteristics conducive to the rise of hegemonic masculinity within military ranks. 

Understanding hegemonic masculinities and the intensification of these expressions in contexts of war, crisis, or armed conflict remains a nuanced issue that cannot be applied uniformly to every situation. Alan Greig, a gender specialist and independent consultant working with organisations and activist movements in both the Global North and South on issues of gender justice, social oppression, and political violence, recently conducted extensive research on this subject. He argues that “the system of war is not merely gendered; it structures gender itself”.[46]Greig, A. (2023). Hommes, masculinities et conflits armés : résultats d’une étude menée dans quatre pays (Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom [WILPF]). p.12 … Continue reading

War must be understood as an amplifier of social norms. Gender relations are therefore profoundly affected in societies subjected to such violence, which become spaces where exacerbated forms of masculinity are performed and reinforced. Male violence and the violence of combat become intertwined as expressions of hegemonic masculinity, which in turn continues to permeate the societies affected by war.

To cite this work: Mathilde VERRIER, “Hegemonic Masculinity in Times of Armed Conflict: The Case of the Russian–Ukrainian Conflict Examined Through the Lens of Hegemonic Masculinity,” November 26, 2025, Institute of Gender in Geopolitics. https://igg-geo.org/2025/11/26/la-masculinite-hegemonique-dans-le-cadre-du-conflit-russo-ukrainien/

References

References
1 Baker, P., & Brookes, G. (2025), Masculinities and language. Polity Press https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/99318/9781040325636.pdf
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3 Hagège, M., & Vuattoux, A. (2015), Compte rendu du livre Masculinités. Enjeux sociaux de l’hégémonie, par R. Connell,. Politix, 109(1), pp. 170-172 https://doi.org/10.3917/pox.109.0170
4 Hagège, M., & Vuattoux, A. (2015), Compte rendu du livre Masculinités. Enjeux sociaux de l’hégémonie, par R. Connell,. Politix, 109(1), pp. 170-172. https://doi.org/10.3917/pox.109.0170
5 Hagège, M., & Vuattoux, A. (2015), Compte rendu du livre Masculinités. Enjeux sociaux de l’hégémonie, par R. Connell,. Politix, 109(1), p.172 https://doi.org/10.3917/pox.109.0170
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8 Jacqmin, D. (2018, 29 mai). L’industrie de défense ukrainienne : un pied en URSS, l’autre dans l’OTAN, GRIP, p. 8 https://www.grip.org/lindustrie-de-defense-ukrainienne-un-pied-en-urss-lautre-dans-lotan/
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15 Naves, M.-C. (2019, 30 avril). Pour les populistes nationalistes, l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes remet en cause un ordre établi. IRIS. https://www.iris-france.org/136293-pour-les-populistes-nationalistes-legalite-entre-les-femmes-et-les-hommes-remet-en-cause-un-ordre-etabli/
16 RTL. (2017, 5 août). VIDÉO – Vladimir Poutine bronze et pêche dans les eaux du lac Baïkal en Sibérie. https://www.rtl.fr/actu/international/video-vladimir-poutine-bronze-et-peche-un-enorme-brochet-en-siberie-7789624372
17 Sperling, V. (2014, 5 décembre). « Happy Birthday, Mr. Putin! »: celebrating political masculinity in Russia. OUPblog. https://blog.oup.com/2014/12/putin-political-masculinity-russia/
18, 19, 29, 30 Trisko Darden, J. (2024, March). Russian women in the face of war with Ukraine. Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/03/russian-women-in-the-face-of-war-against-ukraine/
20 CNBC. (2023, 24 avril). “Be a real man,” Russia looks to recruit fighters for Ukraine war. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/24/be-a-real-man-russia-looks-to-recruit-fighters-for-ukraine-war.html
21 VisitUkraine.Today. (2024, 17 mai). “Reserve+: the Ministry of Defence showed an application where military conscripts will be able to update their data.” VisitUkraine.Today. https://visitukraine.today/blog/3961/reserve-the-ministry-of-defence-showed-an-application-where-military-conscripts-will-be-able-to-update-their-data
22, 23 Le Monde. (2025, 15 février). Ukraine offers one-year army contract for 18-24-year-olds. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/02/15/ukraine-offers-one-year-army-contract-for-18-24-year-olds_6738179_4.html
24 “Full speech on anniversary of full-scale Russian invasion by Ukraine president Zelenskyy” (2023, 24 février). https://english.nv.ua/nation/full-speech-on-anniversary-of-full-scale-russian-invasion-by-ukraine-president-zelenskyy-50306539.html
25 Al Jazeera. (2023, 20 septembre). “Full text : Zelenskyy’s speech to the UN General Assembly” Al Jazeera
26 Al Jazeera. (2023, 20 septembre). “Full text: Zelenskyy’s speech to the UN General Assembly” Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/20/full-text-zelenskyys-speech-to-the-un-general-assembly
27 L’agence publicitaire Banda, basée à Kyiv et Los Angeles, a mis en œuvre cette initiative via affichages, vidéos, autocollants, et même produits de consommation, à la fois en Ukraine et à l’étranger.
28 Kaneva, N. (2022, 21 août
31 Demetriou, D. Z. (2015). La masculinité hégémonique : lecture critique d’un concept de Raewyn Connell (H. Bouvard, trad.). Genre, sexualité & société, (13), pp. 337-361 https://journals.openedition.org/gss/3546
32 Le 1 Hebdo. (2025, 16 avril). Qu’est-ce qu’être un homme ? Le 1 Hebdo, (541).
33 Le Monde. (2024, 22 mars). La Russie ajoute le mouvement international LGBT à sa liste des « terroristes et extrémistes ». https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/03/22/la-russie-ajoute-le-mouvement-international-lgbt-a-sa-liste-des-terroristes-et-extremistes_6223550_3210.html
34 Courrier International. (s.d.). Verbatim. Prédateur, crétins… échange d’amabilités entre Zelensky et Poutine. https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/verbatim-predateur-cretins-echange-d-amabilites-entre-zelensky-et-poutine
35 Le Grand Continent. (s.d.). Violences impériales. L’actualité russe du passé soviétique.https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/themes/histoire/violences-imperiales-lactualite-russe-du-passe-sovietique/
36 Télérama. (2022, 6 mars). Guerre en Ukraine : à l’origine du conflit, la masculinité triomphante.https://www.telerama.fr/debats-reportages/guerre-en-ukraine-a-l-origine-du-conflit-la-masculinite-triomphante-7009494.php
37 Paché, S., & Crémieux-Labail, R. (éds.). (2022). Défendre la France : le temps des soldats-citoyens et la défaite du citoyen-soldat (Presses universitaires de Rennes). https://books.openedition.org/pur/17211?lang=fr
38 Saint Maurice, T. de (2023). Serviteur du Peuple. Un président peut en cacher un autre. Dans S. Laugier (Dir.), Les séries, laboratoire d’éveil politique. CNRS Éditions. https://hal.science/hal-04626435
39 Le Monde. (2022, 12 juillet). Le tee-shirt kaki de Volodymyr Zelensky, reflet d’une com’ très maîtrisée. https://www.lemonde.fr/series-d-ete/article/2022/07/12/le-tee-shirt-kaki-de-volodymyr-zelensky-reflet-d-une-com-tres-maitrisee_6134401_3451060.html
40 France 24. (2024, 29 juillet). En Ukraine, Zelensky visite ses troupes sur le front et Moscou dit avancer à l’Est. https://www.france24.com/fr/info-en-continu/20240729-ukraine-zelensky-sur-le-front-moscou-dit-progresser-à-l-est
41 L’Orient-Le Jour. (2024, 12 décembre). Zelensky dit visiter ses troupes près de la ligne du front dans le sud de l’Ukraine. https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1439503/zelensky-dit-visiter-ses-troupes-pres-de-la-ligne-du-front-dans-le-sud-de-lukraine.html
42, 43, 44 d’Istria, T. (2024, 11 décembre). Sur le front ukrainien, les soldats épuisés se battent sans répit. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/12/11/sur-le-front-ukrainien-les-soldats-epuises-se-battent-sans-repit_6442668_3210.html
45 Vautier, A. (2022-2024). Si tu traverses l’hiver. Deux années de guerre en Ukraine. 2022-2024. https://www.adrienvautier.com/guerre-en-ukraine-2022#1
46 Greig, A. (2023). Hommes, masculinities et conflits armés : résultats d’une étude menée dans quatre pays (Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom [WILPF]). p.12 https://www.wilpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/21_WILPF-Men-Masculinities-Armed-Conflict-French_vis3.pdf