The status of women in Iran since 1979: explaining the changes driven by the Revolution and Globalisation 1/3

Temps de lecture : 5 minutes

Iran’s changing societal customs since the 1979 Revolution

Illustrateur Nato Tardieu

August 28, 2019
Written by Deborah Rouach
Translated by Anaïs Loye-Marangone
To better understand the contrasts and paradoxes of the current situation in Iran, it is necessary to explore the societal changes that have marked the status and role of women in Iranian society since 1979. It is important to grasp the subtlety of these developments, whose motives and outcomes expose the particularity of Iranian society. It is important to bear in mind that some of the changes brought about by the 1979 Revolution are the breeding ground for the current challenges faced by Iranian women.
Since 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini and the clergy have imposed a vision of women based on an obscurantist perception of Islam. They institutionalised a society based on the essentialisation of patriarchal principles and gendered identities ^[1]COSTA-LASCOUX Jacqueline, « Préface », Islam politique, sexe et genre, sous la direction de CHAFIQ Chahla, Presses Universitaires de France, 2011, p. XI-XIV. with a return to a traditional model based on Sharia law, the source of law under the new Islamic Republic. The inauguration of this discriminatory gendered system has severely impacted the integrity and restricted the freedoms of women, who are seen as eternal minors and second-class citizens. They are deprived of the right to control their own bodies through the obsessive veiling of their bodies, excluded from active society and subjected to the guardianship of a man throughout their lives. The suspension of the family code^[2]It granted women the right to divorce and raised the legal age of marriage for girls to 18., the installation of gender segregation, polygamy and the need to have the husband’s consent to enter the public space demonstrate that the woman’s body has become the expression of the new regime’s power. The “legislative and social measures intended to preserve the order of the sacred and the hierarchy of power within society^[3]CHAFIQ Chahla, Islam politique, sexe et genre : À la lumière de l’expérience iranienne, Presses Universitaires de France, 2011, p. 154.” will allow pervasive legal and religious control of women in the name of protecting male honor.
However, what is most surprising about the Iranian case is the compatibility of an authoritarian Islamisation of society paradoxically accompanied by a socio-demographic revolution with decisive consequences for the emancipation of women. The Islamic Republic has unwittingly participated in the process of women’s empowerment, which Thierry Coville describes as an “invisible revolution^[4]COVILLE Thierry, Iran, la révolution invisible, La découverte, 2007, p. 9.”. Marie Ladier-Fouladi, a specialist on Iran, speaks of a “social context in accelerated mutation^[5]LADIER-FOULADI Marie, « Iran  : mutation sociale et contestation politique », Politique étrangère, Automne, n°3, septembre 2012, p. 505‑517.” meaning the process of generalised and free schooling for girls^[6]In 2006, the proportion of literate women aged 15 to 49 was 87.4% and their schooling lasted an average of 8.9 years, whereas in 1976 only 28% of women were literate for 1.9 years (LADIER-FOULADI … Continue reading, the first step towards a social, economic and political modernisation of the lives of Iranian women. Moreover, there are more girls than boys in universities: more than 55% in 1999-2000 and more than 60% in 2000-2001^[7]KIAN-THIÉBAUT Azadeh, Les femmes iraniennes entre Islam, État et famille, Maisonneuve & Larose, 2002, p. 223..
In addition, women will withdraw from the intimate sphere thanks to the economic crisis resulting from the oil embargo in 1980, the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, but also thanks to the reduction in state family allowances which encourages urban and rural women to work. This will have an impact on the average age of women at the time of their first marriage, which falls from 19.7 years in 1976 to 24 years in 2006. Field studies conducted by Marie Ladier-Fouladi^[8]LADIER-FOULADI Marie, Iran, un monde de paradoxes, L’Atalante, 2009, p. 58. also show that the fertility rate in 1986 was 6.4 children per woman compared to 1.9 in 2007, which can be explained by the results of the reforms applied under the imperial regime, the application of family planning put in place by the government in 1988^[9]LADIER-FOULADI Marie, « La transition de la fécondité en Iran », Population, vol. 51, n° 6, 1996, p. 1114. due to the social and economic problems following the war against Iraq and the generalisation of the use of contraceptives^[10]That is 66% of married women aged 15 to 45 in 1991, then 74% in 2000 in LADIER-FOULADI Marie, Iran, un monde de paradoxes, op. cit., authorised by Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa in 1980.
These societal developments, characteristic of endogenous modernity, have made women aware of the injustice they suffer because of their gender. In addition, a change in mentality has been observed that disrupts their behaviour towards authority figures in the private and public sphere, in intergenerational relations and with men. The patriarchal order will be undermined within the family, a real boost for the government, which has made the family institution sacred, in order to “establish a balanced relationship between the sexes and the generations^[11]LADIER-FOULADI Marie, Iran, un monde de paradoxes, L’Atalante, 2009, p. 74.”.
Although the government manages to ensure its continued existence by maintaining strict control over society, as evidenced by the politicisation of the sexual issue^[12]ADELKHAH Fariba, Les paradoxes de l’Iran : idées reçues sur la République islamique, le Cavalier bleu, 2016, p. 120., which has been explicitly made a public matter, the pressure exerted on Iranian women is problematic and has unintended effects for the government. Indeed, women have never ceased to challenge the system since 1979, attacking discriminatory measures such as the compulsory wearing of the hijab, which crystallises the demands expressed by Iranian women. The complexity of this debate is highlighted by Fariba Adelkhah, who describes the veil as both a “passport to public access and social life for women^[13]ADELKHAH Fariba, Les paradoxes de l’Iran : idées reçues sur la République islamique, le Cavalier bleu, 2016, p. 138.” and a “social contract^[14]ADELKHAH Fariba, op.cit. p. 139.” in crisis concluded between unequal actors. True to the paradoxes that make up the Iranian system, the wearing of the veil, by ensuring continuity between the private and the social, has enabled Islamist women to exercise a professional activity. The public sphere, a place of “appearance” where society is scrutinised by the government, exposes the subtle balance between modernisation and tradition that takes place there. The public sphere should no longer be “neither the private nor the political sphere^[15]COVILLE Thierry, Iran, la révolution invisible, La découverte, 2007, p. 159.” in order to rationalise social life and put an end to the confrontation between two visions of society instrumentalised by the population and the government.
Moreover, Iran’s strong anchorage in globalisation from the 1990s onwards has contributed to the emergence of new values, such as the modernisation of individual aspirations and the rise of individualism among Iranians, overturning the definition of the imposed individual. The measures taken by the regime with regard to women thus embody the desire to purge society of all modernisation and societal westernisation begun under the Shah of Iran, a phenomenon described as “westoxication^[16]ADELKHAH Fariba, Les paradoxes de l’Iran : idées reçues sur la République islamique, le Cavalier bleu, 2016, p. 12.”. The disillusionment of women, confronted with the gap between their condition and the place they wished to occupy, reinforced their bitterness towards the power and obsolete rules controlling their lives. By questioning customs and rules, the women reveal their desire to find an identity that is consistent with their cultural vision of society.
The evolution of the status of women can therefore be seen as the keystone of a profound change in Iranian society. The dichotomy between a modern society and the authoritarianism of “leaders [who] think they are the guardians of a tradition even though the popular wave that carries them is the result of a modernising mental revolution^[17]TODD Emmanuel et COURBAGE Youssef, Le rendez-vous des civilisations, La République des idées, Éditions du Seuil, 2007, p. 98.” illustrates the contrasts present in Iran. The receptivity of Iranians to a new way of life reflects their growing distance from the values of the 1979 Revolution and the government, as well as the importance of the cognitive dimension of change. These mixed developments reinforce the unease of the population whose identity crisis has not been resolved by the government, which persists in legitimising the refusal to liberalise the status of women.

To cite this article: Deborah Rouach, ”Comprendre les mutations qui affectent l’Iran à travers la question de la condition des femmes”, Mémoire de master, under the direction of  Mr Thierry Coville, Iris Sup’, 2019, 56 p.