Protecting Our Women: Weaponizing Migrant Masculinities and Gendered Nationalism in the Iberian Peninsula

Temps de lecture : 15 minutes

24/07/2025

Mariana Rodrigues

Introduction

The Iberian Peninsula, comprising Spain and Portugal, holds significant geopolitical and cultural importance in Europe, especially as the entry point for migrants traveling from Africa and beyond. This historical and contemporary reality has shaped the discourse on migration in these countries. In recent years, the rise of far-right parties, such as Spain’s Vox (a national conservative political party led by Santiago Abascal) and Portugal’s Chega (a national conservative right-wing populist political party led by André Ventura), has become increasingly intertwined with anti-immigration rhetoric, often targeting male migrants. These parties have securitized the topic of migration in a post-truth era, where emotional appeals and misinformation often outweigh facts and objective reality, by employing racialized and gendered narratives to foster fear and resentment toward migrant communities, particularly male migrants. By weaponizing historical stereotypes and patriarchal norms, they paint male migrants as threats to national security and cultural purity, often framing the discourse in terms of gendered nationalism, with an emphasis on “protecting native women.”

This article seeks to explore how far-right political parties in Spain and Portugal use gendered and racialized narratives in their political discourse regarding male migrants, analysing the implications of these narratives on societal attitudes and policy-making. To achieve this, the article will also provide historical and geographical context for Portugal and Spain, to understand the developments that have led to the current rise of the far-right.

Contextualizing Migration in the Iberian Peninsula

Spain and Portugal’s geographical location at the crossroads between Europe and Africa makes them primary entry points for migrants seeking better opportunities in the European Union. Historically, both have had a complex relationship with migration, shaped by their colonial past and changing global dynamics. While both countries initially experienced outward migration during the early 20th century, they later became host countries for migrants from former colonies and non-former colonies. 

Spain hosts two of the most significant and active migration routes. The Western Mediterranean Route (WMR) facilitates irregular migration via the Mediterranean Sea and through the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla, Spain’s autonomous cities in North Africa. Migrants from West, Central, and North Africa, among other regions, transit through Morocco and Algeria to reach Spain. Migration trends on this route have fluctuated [1]Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, “The Western Mediterranean and the Western African Atlantic Routes,” 2024. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading [2]Frontex, “Western Mediterranean,” 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory_routes/2025/ANNEX_Western-Mediterranean_up-to-2023.pdf.. The Western African Atlantic Route (WAAR) is another major irregular migration pathway to Spain, involving perilous Atlantic crossings to the Canary Islands. Departures primarily originate from Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, and The Gambia. Migration began rising again in 2018, even during COVID-19 [3]Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, “The Western Mediterranean and the Western African Atlantic Routes,” 2024. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading.

African migration to Portugal began following the independence of former colonies (1974–1975), initially driven by war refugees from Guinea-Bissau and Angola. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, migration diversified, shaped by post-colonial ties and labour demands[4]Cáritas Portuguesa, “Common Home: Migration and Development in Portugal,” 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.caritas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CommonHomePortugalEN2.pdf.. Cape Verdeans formed the first major wave, facilitating subsequent arrivals. Since 2000, Angolan migration has grown, particularly among young males in Lisbon. São Tomé and Príncipe nationals also increased, while Mozambican migration remained steady[5]Cáritas Portuguesa, “Common Home: Migration and Development in Portugal,” 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.caritas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CommonHomePortugalEN2.pdf.. In the 21st century, Asian communities, particularly Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi migrants, have also established a strong presence, primarily in commerce and entrepreneurship. Portugal’s historical colonial ties contrast with migration from Eastern Europe and Asia, where different economic and cultural dynamics prevail[6]Cáritas Portuguesa, “Common Home: Migration and Development in Portugal,” 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.caritas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CommonHomePortugalEN2.pdf.

These shifts in migration patterns to Spain and Portugal brought with them new challenges and opportunities for integration, but heightened debates as well about national identity and cultural belonging, especially with the rise of the far-right. A key dimension of these debates is how gender and race intersect in the portrayal of migrants, particularly male migrants, who are increasingly framed as threats to national values, security, and women’s safety.

Rise of Far-Right Parties in Portugal and Spain

Chega has rapidly become a dominant force in Portuguese politics, significantly reshaping the country’s far-right landscape. Founded in 2019 under the leadership of André Ventura, the party secured its first parliamentary seat within a year of its establishment. At the time, besides being a law professor, he was a member of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and a mayoral candidate in Loures, one of Portugal’s most populous municipalities, with the backing of the Christian-Democratic Popular Party (CDS-PP)[7]R. Santos e S. Roque, “The populist far right and the intersection of anti-immigration and antifeminist agendas: the Portuguese case,” 2021. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading.

His background in the media, both as a football commentator and an opinion columnist for Correio da Manhã, further amplified his political reach. His dismissal from the newspaper, allegedly for editorial reasons after proposing special confinement measures for Roma people, only fuelled his public profile. Chega capitalized on Ventura’s media savviness and populist rhetoric, combining anti-establishment discourse with attacks on minorities[8]R. Santos e S. Roque, “The populist far right and the intersection of anti-immigration and antifeminist agendas: the Portuguese case,” 2021. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading.

In the 2021 presidential elections, Ventura secured 12% of the vote, narrowly missing second place[9]R. Santos e S. Roque, “The populist far right and the intersection of anti-immigration and antifeminist agendas: the Portuguese case,” 2021. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading. By 2024, Chega had expanded its parliamentary representation to 50 out of 230 deputies in the Portuguese Assembly, making it Portugal’s third-largest political force since the fall of the dictatorship [10]Público, 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www.publico.pt/2024/03/11/politica/noticia/chega-terceira-maior-forca-politica-democracia-2083255. [11]CNN Portugal, 2024. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading. The party employs      both populist (people vs. elite) and nationalist (ingroup vs. outgroup) narratives, reinforcing its political influence[12]R. Marchi e J. Zúquete, “Far right populism in Portugal: The political culture of Chega’s members,” 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27361582..

Far-right parties have also increasingly established themselves in Spanish politics. Vox was established in December 2013 following an internal schism within the mainstream right-wing People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP). The party was founded by former PP members dissatisfied with the leadership of then-Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, whom they criticized for his moderate stance on economic liberalism, traditional values, and Catalonia’s separatist movement. Closely aligned with former Prime Minister José María Aznar, these dissidents sought to position Vox as a party further to the right of the PP while rejecting association with the far-right label[13]A. López, “Vox, a new old fashioned radical right in Spain,” 2022. [Online]. Available: file:///C:/Users/ASUS%20ZENBOOK/Downloads/pe-2022-2-8.pdf.

Initially, Vox was led by Alejo Vidal-Quadras, a former president of the PP in Catalonia and a prominent figure in its conservative wing. Under his leadership, the party contested the 2014 European elections but narrowly failed to secure a seat. Shortly thereafter, Vidal-Quadras resigned to prevent further division within the right-wing electorate, allowing Santiago Abascal, a former Basque parliamentarian, to assume leadership[14]A. López, “Vox, a new old fashioned radical right in Spain,” 2022. [Online]. Available: file:///C:/Users/ASUS%20ZENBOOK/Downloads/pe-2022-2-8.pdf. Vox remained politically marginal until the 2018 Andalusian elections, where it gained nearly 11% of the vote and 12 regional parliamentary seats[15]V. Rubio-Pueyo, “VOX: A NEW FAR RIGHT IN SPAIN?,” 2024. [Online]. Available: https://rosalux.nyc/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/RLS-NYC_VOX_Spain_EN.pdf.. By the 2023 general election, Vox had consolidated its influence, becoming the third-largest party in the Spanish parliament with 33 seats, alongside six representatives in the European Parliament[16]EURACTIV, “Poll: Support for Spain’s Vox has grown steadily since 2023 election,” 2025. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading.

Avidad (2025) hypothesizes that the rise of far-right parties like Vox in Spain and Chega in Portugal can be attributed to economic insecurity and a sense of dislocation among certain groups fostering a longing for traditional values. Male support for these parties, in particular, can therefore be linked to a reaction against postmaterialist cultural shifts, such as gender equality, which are perceived to undermine male status and privileges. As a result, Vox’s and Chega’s populist discourse, emphasizing national and male greatness, resonates with these individuals[17]M. Avaidad, “Hegemonic masculinity as populist strategy: unveiling Spain’s radical-right gender gap,” 2025. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1332/25151088Y2025D000000074..

Both Vox and Chega are populist parties that use anti-immigrant rhetoric as a central pillar of their political platform. They often position themselves as a protector of a national culture and identity, often framing immigration as a direct threat to the country’s traditional values.  Importantly, both parties also exploit the perceived failure of political elites to address issues like unemployment and economic insecurity, positioning themselves as champions of the “common people” against the elites, who they claim are complicit in the mismanagement of migration.

Gendered and Racialized Narratives on Male Migrants

In a study written for Oxfam’s Research Backgrounder, Greig (2019) explains that far-right politicians exploit moral panic about the “dangerous masculinity of the radicalized others”[18]A. Greig, “Masculinities and the Rise of the Far-Right Implications for Oxfam’s.,” 2019. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading to construct migrants as cultural and physical threats to national women. This rhetoric allows them to position themselves as protectors of traditional family values and enforcers of national security. Such narratives draw heavily from colonial discourses, where European imperialists framed their interventions as moral missions to protect colonized women from the alleged dangers posed by colonized men, thereby justifying their domination and control[19]A. Greig, “Masculinities and the Rise of the Far-Right Implications for Oxfam’s.,” 2019. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading. The colonial legacy of depicting racialized men as simultaneously hypersexualized threats and infantilized subjects remains deeply ingrained in contemporary far-right ideology[20]A. Greig, “Masculinities and the Rise of the Far-Right Implications for Oxfam’s.,” 2019. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading [21]B. Suárez, “GENDER AND IMMIGRATION IN VOX. THE DISCOURSE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT IN SPAIN,” 2021. [Online]. Available: file:///C:/Users/ASUS%20ZENBOOK/Downloads/ana_martin,+Migraciones+51_08-1.pdf..

The gendered dimension of Vox’s discourse is closely tied to its emphasis on traditional masculinity. As Martínez (2025) notes, far-right parties like Vox are male-dominated both in leadership and voter base, with approximately two-thirds of their supporters being men[22]M. Avaidad, “Hegemonic masculinity as populist strategy: unveiling Spain’s radical-right gender gap,” 2025. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1332/25151088Y2025D000000074.. Another crucial context for understanding Vox’s rise and its anti-immigration rhetoric as the party gained traction in 2019, particularly in regions with high levels of irregular immigration, where their message resonated strongly[23]B. Suárez, “GENDER AND IMMIGRATION IN VOX. THE DISCOURSE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT IN SPAIN,” 2021. [Online]. Available: file:///C:/Users/ASUS%20ZENBOOK/Downloads/ana_martin,+Migraciones+51_08-1.pdf.

Merging racialized and gendered narratives, the far-right Spanish party Vox builds its political discourse around framing migration as a security threat, particularly on the topic of gender. Vox has consistently emphasized the alleged link between migration and violence, particularly against women and LGBTQ+ individuals[24]A. Alcaraz, “Desinformación, posverdad, polarización y racismo en Twitter: análisis del discurso de Vox sobre las migraciones durante la campaña electoral andaluza (2022),” 2023. [Online]. … Continue reading. During a debate for the 2022 Andalusian Regional Elections, Macarena Olona, the Vox candidate blamed illegal immigration as the cause for insecurity felt in Andalusia by women and homosexuals: “Never before has a homosexual or a woman walked the streets of Andalusia as insecurely as they do today. And this is a consequence of the policies of the “call effect” on illegal immigration.” [25]A. Alcaraz, “Desinformación, posverdad, polarización y racismo en Twitter: análisis del discurso de Vox sobre las migraciones durante la campaña electoral andaluza (2022),” 2023. [Online]. … Continue reading. This claim aligns with Vox’s broader narrative, which insists that migrants violate societal norms and pose a direct threat to Spanish citizens. Furthermore, the party has been known to manipulate data to support its anti-immigration rhetoric, as seen in its 2023 municipal election campaign, where Vox misrepresented statistics on crime in Catalonia to falsely portray immigrants as responsible for a majority of violent offenses[26]El País, “Spanish far-right party Vox campaigns on illegal immigration using manipulated data,” 2023. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading.

Overall, Vox’s gendered approach to migration discourse is a strategic manipulation of deep-seated fears and traditional gender roles. By constructing migrant men as violent threats and Spanish men as protectors, the party not only advances its anti-immigration agenda but also reinforces a patriarchal social order. The overlap of racialized and gendered narratives, as discussed by Greig (2019), Suárez (2021), and Martínez (2025), highlights how far-right populism capitalizes on collective anxieties to mobilize support [27]A. Greig, “Masculinities and the Rise of the Far-Right Implications for Oxfam’s.,” 2019. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading [28]B. Suárez, “GENDER AND IMMIGRATION IN VOX. THE DISCOURSE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT IN SPAIN,” 2021. [Online]. Available: file:///C:/Users/ASUS%20ZENBOOK/Downloads/ana_martin,+Migraciones+51_08-1.pdf. [29]M. Avaidad, “Hegemonic masculinity as populist strategy: unveiling Spain’s radical-right gender gap,” 2025. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1332/25151088Y2025D000000074..

Similarly to Spain’s Vox, Portugal’s Chega adopts gendered and racialized discourses that frame immigration, security, and national identity within a patriarchal narrative emphasizing the alleged perceived threat posed by migrant men.

A significant aspect of this gendering is the way Chega, adopting the same discourses as Vox, constructs migrant men as a source of insecurity and violence. On March 28, 2023, a tragic attack at the Centro Ismaelita in Lisbon,  in which an Afghan man, due to unknown motivations, killed two women with a knife, was quickly linked by the party to extremism and Muslim migrants. Chega’s leader, André Ventura, used the attack as an opportunity to reinforce his party’s narrative of violence and insecurity linked to migrant men, particularly those from Muslim-majority countries[30]Expresso, “Chega acusado de oportunismo e discurso de ódio em debate sobre “imigração e segurança”,” 2023. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading. This framing aligns with the broader narrative that portrays migrant men as prone to sexual violence and radicalization, exacerbating the racialized stereotypes of migrant men as dangerous “Others” who threaten both national security and gender equality[31]R. Santos e S. Roque, “The populist far right and the intersection of anti-immigration and antifeminist agendas: the Portuguese case,” 2021. [Online]. Available: 10.21825/digest.v8i1.16958.. This incident, though isolated, was instrumentalized to perpetuate these tropes by the far-right Portuguese party. 

In addition to the racialization of migrant men, Chega continues to emphasize the presence of foreigners within Portugal’s prison system as indicative of the dangers posed by migration. According to André Ventura, 20% of the prison population in 2024 was foreign, a statistic he used to stoke fears of migrant crime[32]CNN Portugal, “André Ventura no Porto contra imigração: “Nós não estamos dispostos a ser invadidos”,” 2024. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading. However, official data from the Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna (Annual Internal Security Report) contradicts this claim, showing that only 16.7% of the prison population was foreign in 2023 and 17.4% in 2024, among those foreign prisoners other European nationals are also accounted for – thus the vast majority of prisoners (more than 80%) being Portuguese men in both years [33]Polígrafo SAPO, “André Ventura: “Sabemos que 20% da atual população prisional também são estrangeiros”,” 2024. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading [34]Governo da República Portugal, “Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna (RASI 2024),” 2025. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading. Despite this, Chega’s rhetoric continues to emphasize foreignness as a key factor in the perceived rise of crime and insecurity. Beyond the misrepresentation of data, it is crucial to denounce the systemic violence faced by migrants and the persistent lack of effective policies aimed at their integration into society. Rather than addressing the structural causes of marginalization, parties like Chega perpetuate disinformation that scapegoats migrants, contributing to social exclusion and reinforcing cycles of insecurity. A genuine approach to public safety must therefore focus on combating misinformation, promoting integration, and addressing the broader inequalities that disproportionately affect migrant communities.

Francisco Gomes, a deputy elected by Chega in Madeira, has also played a significant role in advancing this discourse. Gomes has openly criticized the Portuguese government’s immigration policy, which he argues has led to an “uncontrolled” influx of migrants from some of the “most problematic” areas of the world. According to Gomes, the increase in immigration has directly contributed to rising levels of insecurity and crime within the country. His statements align with the broader Chega narrative, framing immigration as a threat to Portuguese society, particularly in terms of crime and the safety of women[35]E. Franco, “Chega culpa “imigração descontrolada” pelo aumento da criminalidade,” 2025. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading

Santos and Roque (2021) argue that Chega’s rhetoric also intersects with antifeminist stances, which emerges as a form of femonationalism. On one hand, the party emphasizes Europe’s track record on women’s rights, gender equality, and freedom of choice, placing it in opposition to an imagined ‘backward’ and ‘foreign’ culture, and thus using these values to justify anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim positions. On the other hand, Chega’s focus on issues such as the heteronormative family structure, traditional gender roles, and opposition to gender ideologies reflects its broader resistance to feminist advancements[36]R. Santos e S. Roque, “The populist far right and the intersection of anti-immigration and antifeminist agendas: the Portuguese case,” 2021. [Online]. Available: 10.21825/digest.v8i1.16958.. The result is a paradoxical combination of antifeminism and self-proclaimed promotion of women’s rights, which is heavily tied to racist and Islamophobic tropes.

The connection between racism and Portugal and Spain’s colonial history is also significant, as past justifications for imperial dominance continue to shape contemporary nativist sentiments. Both parties weaponize these historical anxieties by reinforcing the hypervisibility of migrant men as threats, ensuring that immigration remains a central political concern. This mirrors colonial-era racialization, where non-European men were deemed both dangerous and incapable of self-governance, legitimizing their exclusion from social and political life[37]A. Greig, “Masculinities and the Rise of the Far-Right Implications for Oxfam’s.,” 2019. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading [38]B. Suárez, “GENDER AND IMMIGRATION IN VOX. THE DISCOURSE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT IN SPAIN,” 2021. [Online]. Available: file:///C:/Users/ASUS%20ZENBOOK/Downloads/ana_martin,+Migraciones+51_08-1.pdf.. A striking example discussed by Santos and Roque (2021) is when André Ventura, leader of the far-right party Chega, wrote on social media that Joacine Katar Moreira — a former Portuguese deputy of Guinean origin — should be “sent back to her country” after she proposed that artifacts held in Portuguese museums, obtained from former Portuguese colonies, should be returned to their countries of origin[39]Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, “The Western Mediterranean and the Western African Atlantic Routes,” 2024. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading. A similar dynamic can be observed in Spain where during a Senate session, Spanish Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska criticized Vox for offering simplistic solutions to immigration issues, such as the mass expulsion of undocumented migrants, reminding them that “we are no longer in the colonial era; we are working in a different time”[40]Frontex, “Western Mediterranean,” 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory_routes/2025/ANNEX_Western-Mediterranean_up-to-2023.pdf..

In sum, both Chega and Vox’s portray themselves as defenders of ‘native’ Spanish and Portugal women against the supposed threat of migrant violence, advocating for measures such as the expulsion of undocumented migrants[41]M. Avaidad, “Hegemonic masculinity as populist strategy: unveiling Spain’s radical-right gender gap,” 2025. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1332/25151088Y2025D000000074. [42]A. Greig, “Masculinities and the Rise of the Far-Right Implications for Oxfam’s.,” 2019. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading.

Implications for Society and Policy

The narratives constructed by Vox and Chega have significant implications for both society and policy. By framing male migrants as a threat to national security and cultural purity, these parties contribute to the further racialization of migrant populations, reinforcing xenophobia and deepening social polarization. As seen above, both parties purposely misrepresent data by claiming that migrants, particularly male migrants, are responsible for rising violence and insecurity in Portugal and Spain, despite evidence showing no direct correlation between immigration and increased crime rates. This process not only stigmatizes migrants but also undermines efforts at integration and multiculturalism.

One key consequence of these gendered and racialized narratives is the legitimation of more restrictive immigration policies. By framing immigration as a cultural and security threat, these parties advocate for policies that seek to limit or prevent migrant entry, often through border militarization, stricter asylum processes, and the criminalization of irregular migration. For example, one of the main proposals Vox advocates for is to “immediately expel all immigrants who enter Spain illegally, as well as legal immigrants who commit serious crimes or repeatedly commit minor offenses”[43]Cáritas Portuguesa, “Common Home: Migration and Development in Portugal,” 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.caritas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CommonHomePortugalEN2.pdf.. These policies exacerbate existing inequalities and lead to greater marginalization of migrant communities.

Moreover, this rhetoric not only fuels social resentment but also strengthens discriminatory attitudes toward migrant communities, particularly men, leading to a hostile environment for integration and coexistence. In 2020, Bruno Candé, a Portuguese actor of Guinean origin, was murdered by Evaristo Marinho, a former colonial war veteran who had served during Portugal’s occupation of Angola[44]R. Santos e S. Roque, “The populist far right and the intersection of anti-immigration and antifeminist agendas: the Portuguese case,” 2021. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading. That same year, the far-right party Chega organized a protest in Lisbon under the slogan “Portugal is not racist,” openly rejecting the idea that Candé’s killing was racially motivated. This denial undermines the lived experiences of migrant communities in Portugal and dismisses the structural racism and oppression they continue to face[45]Público, 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www.publico.pt/2024/03/11/politica/noticia/chega-terceira-maior-forca-politica-democracia-2083255.. Nonetheless, Marinho was later convicted of racially motivated murder[46]R. Santos e S. Roque, “The populist far right and the intersection of anti-immigration and antifeminist agendas: the Portuguese case,” 2021. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading. More recently, in 2024, Chega held two major anti-immigration protests—one in Lisbon in September and another in Porto in November—where party leader André Ventura reinforced the narrative of rising insecurity, declaring that “Portugal needs immigrants who come here to work, we don’t need them coming here to commit crimes.”[47]CNN Portugal, 2024. [Online]. Available: … Continue reading

Additionally, the focus on gendered narratives diverts attention from the structural causes of migration, such as economic inequality, war, and environmental change. Furthermore, parties like Vox and Chega exploit feminist ideals for political gain by advocating for the protection of ‘native’ women, portrayed solely as victims of foreign men’s violence. This instrumentalization of women’s rights creates a paradox that justifies exclusionary practices and undermines the broader feminist cause, while revealing an intersectional hatred that combines xenophobia, racism, and sexism. This racialized and gendered narrative not only justifies exclusionary practices and reveals an intersectional hatred but also diverts attention from the structural causes of gendered violence, which is also committed by Spanish and Portuguese men. In doing so, it does a disservice to the feminist cause, as it instrumentalizes women’s rights without genuinely addressing the broader and systemic roots of gender-based violence, thereby hindering efforts to meaningfully combat the issue. Besides that, rather than addressing the structural causes of migration, these narratives fixate on migrants as internal threats, ultimately hindering the pursuit of sustainable and humane migration solutions.

Fear as Strategy 

The weaponization of migrant masculinities in the far-right discourse in Portugal and Spain not only reinforces racialized and patriarchal hierarchies but also exposes deeper societal contradictions—where the figure of the “dangerous other” is constructed to uphold a fragile national identity rooted in colonial nostalgia and gendered control. By framing male migrants as threats and native women as symbols in need of protection, these narratives obscure the violence embedded within the nation itself—violence that targets racialized bodies, reinforces exclusion, and co-opts feminist language to serve reactionary ends. This raises urgent questions for Iberian societies: what forms of belonging are being policed under the guise of protection, and whose freedoms are sacrificed to maintain the illusion of a cohesive national self?

To mitigate the proliferation of these harmful discourses, civil society and NGOs should create platforms for migrant voices, sharing positive stories that challenge stereotypes, and advocate for policy changes that prioritize migrant rights, dignity, and integration. Additionally, they should develop public education campaigns and engage in efforts to address the root causes of migration through development and foreign policy initiatives, offering alternative frameworks that highlight migration’s humanitarian and economic benefits. Governments must enact policies that protect vulnerable populations, fostering a balanced, empathetic public discourse on migration while rejecting fear-driven narratives. Furthermore, policies should be research-based and grounded in evidence, ensuring they are not unduly influenced by the post-truth era. This comprehensive approach will help counter harmful narratives and promote more informed and compassionate migration policies, fostering social cohesion and upholding human rights.

 

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Expresso, “Chega acusado de oportunismo e discurso de ódio em debate sobre “imigração e segurança”,” 2023. [Online]. Available: https://expresso.pt/politica/parlamento/2023-04-05-Chega-acusado-de-oportunismo-e-discurso-de-odio-em-debate-sobre-imigracao-e-seguranca-9fc4a7ae.

 

R. Santos e S. Roque, “The populist far right and the intersection of anti-immigration and antifeminist agendas: the Portuguese case,” 2021. [Online]. Available: 10.21825/digest.v8i1.16958.

 

CNN Portugal, “André Ventura no Porto contra imigração: “Nós não estamos dispostos a ser invadidos”,” 2024. [Online]. Available: https://cnnportugal.iol.pt/videos/andre-ventura-no-porto-contra-imigracao-nos-nao-estamos-dispostos-a-ser-invadidos/674200670cf2f130c299967a.

 

Polígrafo SAPO, “André Ventura: “Sabemos que 20% da atual população prisional também são estrangeiros”,” 2024. [Online]. Available: https://poligrafo.sapo.pt/fact-check/andre-ventura-sabemos-que-20-da-atual-populacao-prisional-tambem-sao-estrangeiros/.

 

Governo da República Portugal, “Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna (RASI 2024),” 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.portugal.gov.pt/download-ficheiros/ficheiro.aspx?v=%3d%3dBQAAAB%2bLCAAAAAAABAAzNDExNwYAs4WfKQUAAAA%3d.

 

E. Franco, “Chega culpa “imigração descontrolada” pelo aumento da criminalidade,” 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.dnoticias.pt/2025/1/19/434872-chega-culpa-imigracao-descontrolada-pelo-aumento-da-criminalidade/.

 

V. Waldersee, Portugal minister condemns far-right MP’s attack on black colleague, January 2020. 

 

Infobae, Marlaska afea a Vox sus soluciones en inmigración: “no estamos en época del colonialismo”, October 2024. 

 

VOX, “14 Medidas propuestas en la iniciativa,” n.d.. 

 

BBC, “Bruno Candé: White man jailed for Portugal murder of black actor,” 2021. 

 

Observador, “Chega manifestou-se em Lisboa para dizer que “Portugal não é racista”,” 2020. 

 

Euronews, “André Ventura fala em “dia histórico” na manifestação do Chega contra a “imigração descontrolada””. 

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of the author.

To cite this article: Mariana Rodrigues, « Protecting Our Women: Weaponizing Migrant Masculinities and Gendered Nationalism in the Iberian Peninsula », 24.07.2025, Institut du Genre en Géopolitique. https://igg-geo.org/en/2025/07/24/protecting-our-women-weaponizing-migrant-masculinities-and-gendered-nationalism-in-the-iberian-peninsula/

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33 Polígrafo SAPO, “André Ventura: “Sabemos que 20% da atual população prisional também são estrangeiros”,” 2024. [Online]. Available: https://poligrafo.sapo.pt/fact-check/andre-ventura-sabemos-que-20-da-atual-populacao-prisional-tambem-sao-estrangeiros/.
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