President Yoon Suk Yeol’s decision to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality: a reflection of a South Korean society plagued by growing anti-feminism

Temps de lecture : < 1 minute

By Clara Delhaye
Translated by Kerry Ann Marcotte, November 30th, 2022

At the end of the 1990s, women’s rights felt the impact of an  international boost following the Beijing Declaration on September 15, 1995[1]United Nations (1995), Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dde04324.html. In the Republic of Korea, this led to the creation of various governmental organizations which catered to these issues[2]United Nations (2000), Questionnaire on implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and the Outcome of the Twenty-third Special Session of the General … Continue reading. The Ministry of Gender Equality was created in February 1998 and became operational in January 2001. While its existence has been subject to criticism and threats, it is now facing pressure from the current president, Yoon Suk Yeol, who has assured the public that he wants the Ministry to disappear, by all means necessary[3]Bari, A. (7 octobre 2022). En Corée du Sud, le président Yoon Suk-Yeol menace l’égalité des genres. Vanity … Continue reading. In light of this statement, one may wonder how this possible/potential/eventual abolition of the Ministry of Equality embodies the crystallisation of a South Korean society divided regarding gender and women’s rights issues?

Yoon Suk Yeol’s campaign carried by anti-feminist comments and positions

During the presidential campaign, President Yoon represented the People Power Party (PPP). This conservative Korean party, particularly known for its commitment to security and legal values[4]People power party. (2022). http://www.peoplepowerparty.kr/web/eng/about/introduction.do, is also known for its anti-feminist positions, particularly on abortion issues, and anti-LGBTQIA+ by opposing, for example, the creation of an

anti-discrimination law[5]Jung, D. (17 octobre 2021). PPP floor leader under fire for objecting to ant-féminisme-discrimination law. The KoreaTimes. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2021/10/356_317104.html. Thus, during his presidential campaign from late 2021 to mid-2022, Yoon Suk Yeol was virulent on feminist issues, claiming that structural discrimination against women does not exist; he even added that it is “just an old saying that women are treated unequally and men are treated better”[6]Kang, J.G. (21 février 2022), “구조적 성차별 없다”는 윤석열, 이재명 사과 요구에 “굳이 답변 필요 없다”. … Continue reading in South Korea. It is worth noting that the OECD places South Korea at the bottom of its wage gap ranking, with a gap of 31%[7]OCDE (2022), Écart salarial femmes-hommes. https://doi.org/10.1787/b64d7a8e-fr.

For the current president, since structural, economic and physical inequalities seem to not exist, or exist only to a very limited extent, there is simply no need for the Ministry of Gender Equality. From his vantage point, the abolition of the Ministry has become a key measure of his program. For Yoon, it is an organization that aims to treat South Korean men as potential sex offenders and would only aggravate gender-related issues in South Korea[8]Gunia, A. (10 mars 2022). How South Korea’s Yoon Suk-yeol Capitalized on ant-féminisme-Feminist Backlash to Win the Presidency. … Continue reading. This anti-feminist positioning placed gender issues at the heart of Yoon’s campaign, moving away from the views of the Democratic Party, which, without supporting feminist movements, legalized abortion when it was in power from 2017 to 2022. He was especially opposed to Sim Sang-jung – from the left-wing progressive party – the only female candidate, whose feminist orientations were assumed during this campaign.

However, Yoon’s anti-feminist rhetoric goes beyond mere political opposition; it extends to her response to the growing feminist movements in South Korea in recent years. While South Korean feminists have been active in the political arena since the 2000s, the rise of the internet in the 2010s has allowed for the creation of significant online feminist communities[9]Kim, J. (2021). The resurgence and popularization of Feminism in South Korea : Key issues and challenges for contemporary feminist activism. Korea journal, 61(4), … Continue reading. There were over 11,000 tweets on the #iamafeminist[10]Kim, J. (2017). #iamafeminist as the “mother tag”: feminist identification and activism against misogyny on Twitter hashtag in February 2015, a first in South Korea for a feminist hashtag. Subsequently, social networks have created and amplified certain movements, such as “escape the  corset[11]Shin, Y. & Lee, S. (2022). “Escape the Corset” : How a Movement in South Korea Became a Fashion Statement through Social Media. Sustainability, 14(18), … Continue readingor the fight against “molka”-cameras hidden in walls to film women without their consent[12]Human Rights Watch. (2021). My life is not your porn. https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06/16/my-life-not-your-porn/digital-sex-crimes-south-korea.

However, the misogyny and violence faced by South Korean women are contested and even denied by certain personalities such as the current president, in order to delegitimize South Korean feminist struggles. These increasingly aggressive anti-feminist demands are currently infecting Korean society at the highest levels.

With the emergence of this dichotomy, women, feminists, and public figures (both male and female) claiming to support feminist ideas have been virulently attacked online[13]Lee, C. ( 29 mars 2018). Feminist novel becomes center of controversy in South Korea. The Korea Herald. https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180327000799. Institutions with missions related to gender inequality are similarly challenged, as evidenced by Yoon Suk Yeol’s statements during his campaign against the Ministry of Gender Equality. Now elected, the president maintains his measure and recently stated that he “will himself push[14]Ibid,  Vanity fair.” for the disbandment of the Ministry of Gender Equality. This statement is not surprising, but seems dangerous for South Korean women, who could see some essential rights and services disappear. 

The potential consequences of the abolition of the Ministry in the lives of South Korean women

The Ministry’s missions are diverse, including the creation of national policies on gender equality, the prevention of sexual violence and the participation of women in political life[15]Ministry of gender equality and family. (2022). http://www.mogef.go.kr/eng/pc/eng_pc_f001.do. Since 2010, the Ministry has also been dealing with youth and family issues, however, in South Korea, these are still very gendered issues, with women giving up their careers or studies to take care of their children’s education[16]Hommel, A. (2019.). Moulding Mothers : Political Motherhood in South Korea between 2007 and 2016 [Thèse de master, université de … Continue reading. The Ministry has therefore created solutions to remove these constraints so that women can be mothers and/or wives while working. Behind this stereotypical approach to the role of women, the aim is to increase the currently low birth rate, which is implicitly blamed on South Korean women, not South Koreans.

Thus, policies related to family and children do not address the root problem of the patriarchal and stereotypical approach to roles in South Korean society[17]Ibid, note 12. Despite this, the Ministry does provide real advocacy and policy work for women’s rights, particularly through the implementation of the Ministry’s policies and plans.

For example, following the release of the “Plan for Expanding Women’s Participation” in government committees, South Korea has gone from a female membership of 25.7% in 2012 to 40.2% in 2017[18]Ibid, note 15. This helps to push companies, government institutions or associations to be more vigilant on the recruitment of women by forcing them to comply with certain laws such as those prohibiting the employment of more than 60% of a specific gender within government committees[19]Korea Women’s Associations Uni (2018). Concerns and recommendations on the Republic of Korea, 19 February – 9 March … Continue reading. Moreover, with a budget of almost 1 billion euros, the Ministry is the most influential South Korean institution in terms of women’s rights, yet it represents only 0.24% of the annual budget of the executive branch and is the Ministry with the smallest budget.

However, if it were to disappear, the budgets allocated to day care, child care, extra-curricular activities or the training of professionals to defend victims of domestic violence or sexual trafficking would be stopped. Women would have to stop working again, which would expose them to economic violence. They would also face an increase in structural violence as it is difficult for South Korean women to return to the labor market. Especially when they have left the labor market to raise their children for several years[20]Joo, C. N. (2016). Kim Ji Young born 1982 , Minumsa.. The Covid-19 crisis has shown that when women are in the privacy of their homes, they are more exposed to intimate violence, which is another risk to be taken into account for South Korean women[21]Kim, S., Kim, J. H., Park, Y., Kim, S. & Kim, C. Y. (2020). Gender Analysis of COVID-19 Outbreak in South Korea : A Common Challenge and Call for Action. Health Education & ; Behavior, 47(4), … Continue reading. Finally, if the Ministry, known since the Nht room affair[22]L’affaire “Nht room” est une affaire de cybercriminalité, où dans des groupes telegram, des utilisateurs ont partagé des vidéos de femmes et de mineures agressées sexuellement et/ou … Continue reading for its support to victims of sexual offences, were to disappear, women would lose an essential ally in the fight against sexual violence[23]Kim, J. H. & Jang, H. ( 30 avril 2020). Is the abolition of MOGEF the right move for korea ? The Kaist Herald. https://herald.kaist.ac.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=10231.

Despite these missions and the risks that its disappearance would pose, the Ministry of Gender Equality has often been threatened. Several masculinist associations, public opinion and conservative political figures have campaigned for its abolition since its creation[24]머니투데이. ( 30 juillet 2013). 성재기 사망 « 여성부 필요없다 ?  » 폐지론 다시 공방. 머니투데이 전체. MTN … Continue reading. However, it is now an elected president who is calling for its abolition.

The strength of masculinist groups in the potential abolition of the Ministry of Gender Equality  

According to the president, the ministry’s current approach is solely focused on the inequalities faced by women. This is a position shared by some South Koreans. For them, by trying toaddress gender inequality, the Ministry is deepening inequalities towards men. This is seen as applicable to the creation of quotas for women in universities or companies[25]Kim, J. H. & Kweon, Y. (2022). Why Do Young Men Oppose Gender Quotas ? Group Threat and Backlash to Legislative Gender Quotas. Legislative Studies Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12371 which is perceived by some as an inequality towards men. This is an argument that is present in South Korean anti-feminist discourse, particularly among groups of young men called “idaenam” or “angry young men”, who claim to be victims of a general misandry that women, and especially feminists, are said to be responsible for[26]Kim, S. (2021). Men in their twenties angry at Feminism : Discourse analysis of “Megal and the finger controversy” : 이대남’과 반 페미니즘 담론 :‘메갈 손가락 기호’ … Continue reading.

Thus, by stating his intention to abolish the Ministry, President Yoon has secured the support of these masculinist groups. These groups are important to the current president because they are part of his electorate. According to South Korean newspapers, 59% of men in their twenties voted for the conservative president, compared to only 34% of women[27]Kim, Y (2022), Résultats du sondage à la sortie des urnes pour l’élection présidentielle de 2022 par sexe et âge, 연합뉴스. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/GYH20220309000900044. For the authors, Kim Hannah June and Lee Chungjae[28]Kim, H. J. & Lee, C. (2022). The 2022 South Korean Presidential Election and the Gender Divide among the Youth. Pacific Affairs, 95(2), 285‑308. https://doi.org/10.5509/2022952285, this result can be explained by his anti-feminist discourse, which has seduced young South Koreans and turned South Korean women away. This split was recently observed in demonstrations between women and feminist activists and masculinist groups, with some claiming that “feminists (…) are misandrists” and pledging to “kill them all[29]Rocca, N. ( août 9 2022). « Le féminisme est un cancer »  : La haine des masculinistes en Corée du Sud. Radio … Continue reading”. Given the current divisions within society on these issues, the removal of the Ministry could lead to the increase of these tensions. Moreover, while such public statements are possible today with the existence of a Ministry working to punish gender-based violence, without its presence, they could become increasingly common.

Conclusion

South Korean society is thus divided on the issue of gender inequality. Between feminism and anti-feminism, President Yoon Suk Yeol seems to take a stand. This proposal to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and his words contribute to the ambient anti-feminism. If the Ministry of Gender Equality is abolished, inequality against women and misogyny in general may increase, because although the Ministry is not a perfect institution, it does guarantee the rights of South Korean women. The abolition of the Ministry would only increase tensions in a population already divided over the issues of birth rate and military service.

To cite this production: Clara Delhaye, “La volonté de la suppression du Ministère de l’égalité des genres par le président Yoon Suk Yeol : reflet d’une société coréenne en proie à un anti-féminisme croissant”, 31.11.2022, Institut du Genre en Géopolitique, https://igg-geo.org/?p=9247

The statements in this text are the sole responsibility of the author.

References

References
1 United Nations (1995), Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dde04324.html
2 United Nations (2000), Questionnaire on implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and the Outcome of the Twenty-third Special Session of the General Assembly. https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/Review/responses/REPUBLICofKOREA-English.pdf
3 Bari, A. (7 octobre 2022). En Corée du Sud, le président Yoon Suk-Yeol menace l’égalité des genres. Vanity Fair. https://www.vanityfair.fr/actualites/article/en-coree-du-sud-le-president-yoon-suk-yeol-veut-supprimer-le-Ministères-de-legalite-des-genres
4 People power party. (2022). http://www.peoplepowerparty.kr/web/eng/about/introduction.do
5 Jung, D. (17 octobre 2021). PPP floor leader under fire for objecting to ant-féminisme-discrimination law. The KoreaTimes. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2021/10/356_317104.html
6 Kang, J.G. (21 février 2022), “구조적 성차별 없다”는 윤석열, 이재명 사과 요구에 “굳이 답변 필요 없다”. Hankookilbo. https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022022120540002212
7 OCDE (2022), Écart salarial femmes-hommes. https://doi.org/10.1787/b64d7a8e-fr
8 Gunia, A. (10 mars 2022). How South Korea’s Yoon Suk-yeol Capitalized on ant-féminisme-Feminist Backlash to Win the Presidency. Time. https://time.com/6156537/south-korea-president-yoon-suk-yeol-sexism/ et Kim, H. J. & Lee, C. (2022). The 2022 South Korean Presidential Election and the Gender Divide among the Youth. Pacific Affairs, 95(2), 285‑308. https://doi.org/10.5509/2022952285
9 Kim, J. (2021). The resurgence and popularization of Feminism in South Korea : Key issues and challenges for contemporary feminist activism. Korea journal, 61(4), 75‑101. https://doi.org/10.25024/kj.2021.61.4.75
10 Kim, J. (2017). #iamafeminist as the “mother tag”: feminist identification and activism against misogyny on Twitter
11 Shin, Y. & Lee, S. (2022). “Escape the Corset” : How a Movement in South Korea Became a Fashion Statement through Social Media. Sustainability, 14(18), 11609. https://doi.org/10.3390/su141811609
12 Human Rights Watch. (2021). My life is not your porn. https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06/16/my-life-not-your-porn/digital-sex-crimes-south-korea
13 Lee, C. ( 29 mars 2018). Feminist novel becomes center of controversy in South Korea. The Korea Herald. https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180327000799
14 Ibid,  Vanity fair.
15 Ministry of gender equality and family. (2022). http://www.mogef.go.kr/eng/pc/eng_pc_f001.do
16 Hommel, A. (2019.). Moulding Mothers : Political Motherhood in South Korea between 2007 and 2016 [Thèse de master, université de Séoul]. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02188791.2019.1607720?journalCode=cape20
17 Ibid, note 12
18 Ibid, note 15
19 Korea Women’s Associations Uni (2018). Concerns and recommendations on the Republic of Korea, 19 February – 9 March 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/KOR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_KOR_30063_E.pdf
20 Joo, C. N. (2016). Kim Ji Young born 1982 , Minumsa.
21 Kim, S., Kim, J. H., Park, Y., Kim, S. & Kim, C. Y. (2020). Gender Analysis of COVID-19 Outbreak in South Korea : A Common Challenge and Call for Action. Health Education & ; Behavior, 47(4), 525‑530. https://doi.org/10.1177/1090198120931443
22 L’affaire “Nht room” est une affaire de cybercriminalité, où dans des groupes telegram, des utilisateurs ont partagé des vidéos de femmes et de mineures agressées sexuellement et/ou subissant de nombreux sévices. Les créateurs de ces rooms ont eux-mêmes attiré certaines victimes. L’accès à ces rooms était payant. Cette affaire a secoué et secoue encore toute la société sud-coréenne.
23 Kim, J. H. & Jang, H. ( 30 avril 2020). Is the abolition of MOGEF the right move for korea ? The Kaist Herald. https://herald.kaist.ac.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=10231
24 머니투데이. ( 30 juillet 2013). 성재기 사망 « 여성부 필요없다 ?  » 폐지론 다시 공방. 머니투데이 전체. MTN news. https://news.mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2013073019395952978&outlink=1&ref=%3A%2F%2F
25 Kim, J. H. & Kweon, Y. (2022). Why Do Young Men Oppose Gender Quotas ? Group Threat and Backlash to Legislative Gender Quotas. Legislative Studies Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12371
26 Kim, S. (2021). Men in their twenties angry at Feminism : Discourse analysis of “Megal and the finger controversy” : 이대남’과 반 페미니즘 담론 :‘메갈 손가락 기호’ 논란을 중심으로. Women’s Literature Research, 1(53), 443‑475. https://doi.org/10.15686/fkl.2021..53.443
27 Kim, Y (2022), Résultats du sondage à la sortie des urnes pour l’élection présidentielle de 2022 par sexe et âge, 연합뉴스. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/GYH20220309000900044
28 Kim, H. J. & Lee, C. (2022). The 2022 South Korean Presidential Election and the Gender Divide among the Youth. Pacific Affairs, 95(2), 285‑308. https://doi.org/10.5509/2022952285
29 Rocca, N. ( août 9 2022). « Le féminisme est un cancer »  : La haine des masculinistes en Corée du Sud. Radio France. https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/le-reportage-de-la-redaction/le-feminisme-est-un-cancer-l=a-haine-des-masculinistes-en-coree-du-sud-4942382