Iranian masculinity: a political tool across the centuries

08.09.2023

Emma Beilouny

The study of masculinity has often been overlooked in Iranian history and scholarship, rendering men the “invisible gender” in the conceptual sense. As Thomas Lacquer, historian and sexologist, suggests, societal standards have consistently revolved around men, often rending the concept of gender synonymous to femininity^[1]Laqueur, T. (2003). Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud. Harvard university Press, p. 22.. Masculinities encompass “the various ways of being and acting, values and expectations associated with being and becoming a man in a given society, location and temporal space.^[2]Myrttinen, H. (2018). Navigating norms and insecurity: Men, masculinities, conflict and peacebuilding in Afghanistan, p. 4.” While typically linked with biological men and boys, masculinities are not biologically driven and are not exclusively performed by biological men. Women, girls, and individuals with other gender identities can also express and perform masculinities^[3]Myrttinen, H. (2018). Navigating norms and insecurity: Men, masculinities, conflict and peacebuilding in Afghanistan, p. 4.. However, masculinity is not a universal and fixed concept but rather a historically and culturally constructed framework, intimately intertwined with political and social contexts^[4]Andersen, P. and Simon Wendt. (2015). “Introduction: Masculinities and the Nation.”. Consequently, understanding masculinity is essential for a comprehensive understanding of gender dynamics in Iran, considering its role as both a political tool for governments and a constraint on men^[5]Ghaffari, R. (2020). Beyond Martyrs and Mullahs: Transformations of Gender Roles and Identities Among Tehran Middle-Class’s Men. Central European University. … Continue reading. This essay aims to explore the historical construction of hegemonic masculinity in Iran and its connections to political, economic, and social transformations, shedding light on the intricate gender dynamics prevalent in Iranian society.

From the late 19th century, masculinity, and a new elite

In the late 19th century, Iran saw the emergence of a new social elite seeking to establish its hegemonic position through the use of masculinity^[6]Ghaffari, R. (2020). Beyond Martyrs and Mullahs: Transformations of Gender Roles and Identities Among Tehran Middle-Class’s Men. Central European University. … Continue reading. The development of this new elite masculinity was related to the spread of Western education, resulting in a broader shift in Iranian’s hegemonic masculine ideals, often referred to as “farang” or Westernized^[7]Ghaffari, R. (2020). Beyond Martyrs and Mullahs: Transformations of Gender Roles and Identities Among Tehran Middle-Class’s Men. Central European University. … Continue reading.

A prominent figure of this time was Mirza Malkom Khan, who promoted modern knowledge as the basis for a new model of masculinity through his Qanun newspaper (1890-1898)^[8]Ghaffari, R. (2020). Beyond Martyrs and Mullahs: Transformations of Gender Roles and Identities Among Tehran Middle-Class’s Men. Central European University. … Continue reading. For men like him, embracing modern education and knowledge was a way to elevate one’s status and assert one’s authority and place in society. The Qanun newspaper aimed at creating a new generation of educated men who would go on to contribute to the progress of Iranian society.

Yet, benefits of this masculinity model were primarily enjoyed by the elite and upper middle-class, while the vast majority of men had limited access to education. Indeed, in 1911 Tehran, less than 4% of the population had primary education (with only 20% being girls)^[9]Ghaffari, R. (2020). Beyond Martyrs and Mullahs: Transformations of Gender Roles and Identities Among Tehran Middle-Class’s Men. Central European University. … Continue reading. Adoption of Western education and its associated ideals of masculinity by the Iranian elites also aimed to separate themselves from the conservative and more traditional parts of society. In this sense, constructing a new elite masculinity became a tool of exclusion and social stratification, creating a divide between those who had access to education—and cultural and economic capital—and its associated privileges and those who did not^[10]Balslev, S. (2019). Iranian Masculinities Gender and Sexuality in Late Qajar and Early Pahlavi Iran. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108556880.004.

Furthermore, nationalist sentiments and the constitutional revolution— led by “liberal clerics, bazaar merchants, and reformist bureaucrats and intellectuals^[11]Balslev, S. (2019). Iranian Masculinities Gender and Sexuality in Late Qajar and Early Pahlavi Iran. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108556880.004” (1905-1911) strongly reinforced gendered dichotomies. The constitutional revolution in Iran opened the door to a discourse portraying men as patriotic defenders of the nation, while women were depicted as passive and endangered objects of national honor and virtue^[12]Balslev, S. (2019). Iranian Masculinities Gender and Sexuality in Late Qajar and Early Pahlavi Iran. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108556880.004. The national narratives shifted from imagining the nation as a family, led by the patriarch, the father-Shah, to that of the nation as an ailing mother^[13]Balslev, S. (2019). Iranian Masculinities Gender and Sexuality in Late Qajar and Early Pahlavi Iran. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108556880.004. This gendered dichotomy consolidated and legitimized the new elite masculinity, as patriotism and masculinity grew intertwined.

Nationalism and international relations influenced the construction of masculinity in Iran as well. Political humiliation at the hands of Western powers impacted masculine pride, leading to a desire to assert Iran’s position in the international arena. Consequently, most of this new Western-educated elite sought to exclude both the old elites and the majority of men, as well as all women, from its newly acquired political power^[14]Balslev, S. (2019). Iranian Masculinities Gender and Sexuality in Late Qajar and Early Pahlavi Iran. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108556880.004. Patriotism became synonymous with masculinity, and excluding certain groups, which were not deemed patriotic enough, became a way to consolidate power and maintain these newly constructed masculine ideals^[15]Balslev, S. (2019). Iranian Masculinities Gender and Sexuality in Late Qajar and Early Pahlavi Iran. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108556880.004. “Comparing unpatriotic men to women, and even declaring these men inferior to women” were common tropes found in nationalist journals^[16]Balslev, S. (2019). Iranian Masculinities Gender and Sexuality in Late Qajar and Early Pahlavi Iran. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108556880.004.

Later on, the reformist movements aimed to reshape society through masculinity. The enactment of the 1927 Dress Law under Reza Shah is a notable example of the intersections between personal practices and the state’s influence on masculinity. The Dress Law mandated Western-style clothing for both men and women, reflecting the state’s attempt to modernize and reform society. This law not only influenced personal choices but also symbolized the state’s control over individuals’ bodies and their adherence to Western ideals of masculinity.

The post-1979 homo islamicus

During the Shah’s time, they degraded women and debased women. They said we want to make Iran like Europe—progressive! They harmed two groups the most: ladies and the clergy. They forced women to participate in their debaucheries. They made men, women, and their daughters mingle in their perverted parties, in the name of freedom. -Ayatollah Khomeini (Muslim Women’s Movement 1981, 51)

With the Islamic Revolution of 1979, a new hypermasculine social order emerged, which had far-reaching consequences on the perception and experience of masculinity. Strict implementation of Sharia law, alongside gender segregation and vigilantism, had a profound impact on men’s lives and the construction of their identities. The subsequent war with Iraq further disrupted the process of “structual and cultural changes that modified the notion of gendre roles” that had been occurring from the 1950s to the 1970s, in efforts to improve educational and professional opportunities for women^[17]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526, p. 262.. The westernization of middle-class urban women— the primary beneficiaries of these societal changes— was perceived as a threat to the revolution’s conservative agenda. Through neo-patriarchal policies (focusing on both economic modernization and the preservation of the traditional family structure), the post-revolutionary state sought to counter the so-called “decadence” of the Pahlavi era (the last royal dynasty, in power from 1925 to 1979), associated with Western influence and the erosion of traditional values^[18]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526, p. 262.. These policies were in direct opposition to the 1973 Family Protection Act, a reformed family code, and aimed to strengthen Muslim family law, reinforcing patriarchal norms within society^[19]Moghadam, V. (2018). Iranian Women, Work, and the Gender Regime. The Cairo Review of Global Affairs. https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/iranian-women-work-and-the-gender-regime/. The Islamic state’s control over sexuality, exemplified by the “civil sexuality” policies of the 1980s and 1990s, aiming at reducing divorce rates and increasing fertility rates, were merely “means of enriching and heightening the Irano-Islamic family, the most essential institution in the Islamic society.^[20]Mohammadi, E., and Durnova, A. (2019). Policy expertise and culture: the case of ‘civil sexuality’ in Iran. Iranian Review of Public Policy, 5, 314-334. https://doi.org/10.4000/irpp.2030.” These policies included the conceptualisation of a “notion of sexuality consistent with Iranian culture,” serving the purpose of family planning, through compulsory pre-marriage 6 hour workshops for example^[21]Mohammadi, E., and Durnova, A. (2019). Policy expertise and culture: the case of ‘civil sexuality’ in Iran. Iranian Review of Public Policy, 5, 314-334. https://doi.org/10.4000/irpp.2030..

Middle and upper-class man, seen as individualistic and as the consequence a “pervasive capitalist model that promoted competition, stigmatized vulnerability, and eroded personal self-esteem.^[22]Ghaffari, R. (2020). Beyond Martyrs and Mullahs: Transformations of Gender Roles and Identities Among Tehran Middle-Class’s Men. Central European University. … Continue reading” In reaction, “the Islamic revolution discredited some prerevolutionary masculinity types such as military officers, artists, and even some professionals^[23]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526”, demoting them of social and economic status. And in return, the revolution’s discourse promoted the imagery of the homo islamicus, through mullahs and martyrs, creating hypermasculine prototypes that influenced the models of Iranian masculinity^[24]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526. The construction of hypermasculine images drew inspiration from both fundamentalist mullahs and Marxist Leftists, with references to hypermasculine guerrilla figures such as Che Guevara and the Red Army^[25]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526. Overall, it revolved around two masculine fronts: the urban guerrilla and the clergy^[26]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526.

The prototype of masculinity associated with the clergy represented the masculinity of the state. It was characterized by a cool and dispassionate judgment, as exemplified by the Ayatollah’s famous response when asked how he felt upon his return to Iran: “Nothing^[27]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526”. This image of masculinity stood in opposition to the perceived femininity, softness, and corruption associated with the pre-revolutionary Pahlavi system, opposing “the pious and vengeful men of God” to “the sultry femme fatale of consumerism and Westernism.^[28]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526”

Martyrdom (shahadat) —a martyr often being “a young, unmarried (virgin, innocent) man, fearless and strong”— is associated with Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet who died on the battlefield in 680, and jihad^[29]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526. This hyper masculine symbolism was the by-product of the war against Iraq^[30]Abrahamin, E. (1993). Khomenism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. Los Angeles: University of California Press, seen as a just war “with a usurper of the faith and its imperialist backers.^[31]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526” This ideology was reflected in Iran’s bureaucratic institutions, including the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) and the Shahid Foundation, which aimed at honoring and compensating families that had lost men to the revolution. The overarching goal being that “when a son was martyred, wellwishers should congratulate the family, not express condolences.^[32]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526” Despite women’s sacrifices during the Iran-Iraq war, they were “assigned to witness the heroic acts of their male brethren on the battlefield and mourn their loss.^[33]Schwartz, K. and Gölz, O. (2022). Iran Protests: Women subverting the hyper-masculine order are heroes. The New Arab. … Continue reading”

In the early 2000s, the religious and political power struggle between reformists and conservatives grew, encompassing various issues, including the direction of the economy, Iran’s position on the international stage, the structure of the state, and, most importantly, the clergy’s role within state. This factional fight also had implications for the restructuring of gender roles in post-revolutionary Iran, reflecting the ongoing cultural shifts and debates surrounding masculinity and its relationship with religious and political authority^[34]Gerami, S. (2003). Mullahs, Martyrs, and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Men and Masculinities, 5(3), 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X02238526.

The crisis: emergence of new masculinities to defy the state

Today, the emergence of new masculinities has become a response to the changing social, political, and economic landscape, challenging traditional models and defying the state’s discourse on masculinity^[35]Ghaffari, R. (2020). Beyond Martyrs and Mullahs: Transformations of Gender Roles and Identities Among Tehran Middle-Class’s Men. Central European University. … Continue reading. For Honarbin-Holliday, an Iranian artist, “the state has not been successful in implementing its Islamic model of maleness based on a discourse of martyrdom and suppressed bodies under the banner of religion.^[36]Honarbin-Holliday, M. (2013). Emerging forms of masculinity in The Islamic Republic of Iran. In A. Sreberny & M. Torfeh (Eds), Cultural revolution in Iran, I B Tauris, pp. 59-77, p. 74.” Rather, strong narratives of resistance have emerged, “where young men adopt bodies as tools of differentiation and expression, with specific perceptions of themselves and who they wish to be as individual citizens.^[37]Honarbin-Holliday, M. (2013). Emerging forms of masculinity in The Islamic Republic of Iran. In A. Sreberny & M. Torfeh (Eds), Cultural revolution in Iran, I B Tauris, pp. 59-77, p. 74.”

These new masculinities that challenge the state’s expectations and embrace transnational cultural influences are an evident shift from the revolution’s mandated ethics of modesty^[38]Ghaffari, R. (2020). Beyond Martyrs and Mullahs: Transformations of Gender Roles and Identities Among Tehran Middle-Class’s Men. Central European University. … Continue reading. It is illustrated by the rise of a new iconography of virility, showcased through social networks and visible in the “proliferation of luxurious clubs and gyms reflect[ing] a modern and sophisticated archetypal willing to spend money and time for his body and look.^[39]Adelkhah, F. (1998). Being Modern in Iran. London: C.Hurst&Co.”

Most importantly, Rassa Ghaffari, a researcher in sociology, found that young Iranian men are increasingly “aware and sensitive about gender discrimination and their own privilege.^[40]Ghaffari, R. (2020). Beyond Martyrs and Mullahs: Transformations of Gender Roles and Identities Among Tehran Middle-Class’s Men. Central European University. … Continue reading” In the last 15 years, more men than ever have joined women in social movements demanding civic rights and justice. In 2013, Honarbin-Holliday wrote that men and women “will no doubt return to the streets afresh when the time is right, demanding their individual rights to freedom of speech and expression and a more developed civil society.^[41]Honarbin-Holliday, M. (2013). Emerging forms of masculinity in The Islamic Republic of Iran, p. 74.” Indeed, a 2020 study found that “among the generation of young, educated and secular men who are against the Islamic Republic in Iran and are more familiar with the values of modernity and gender equality under the influence of globalization and digital media, alternative masculinities have emerged in a small section of society.^[42]Darvishpour, Z. (2020). The New Alternative Masculinities among Iranian Young Men A Case Study of a Campaign on Social Media. Master’s Thesis. … Continue reading”

For Farhad Khosrokhavar, a French-Iranian sociologist, a striking difference with today’s revolutions, compared to previous ones, is the socialisation context of young Iranians^[43]Ramond, P. (November 15, 2022). Iran : les symboles d’une révolte, une conversation avec FarhadKhosrokhavar. Le Grand Continent. … Continue reading. There are at least 3 to 4 million Iranians living abroad, and thanks to social media, they keep close ties with their friends and family members in Iran. Khosrokhavar believes that it is what explains the Iranian youth paradox— they have been indoctrinated into believing that women should not be autonomous yet young men are increasingly supporting the women’s rights movement^[44]Ramond, P. (November 15, 2022). Iran : les symboles d’une révolte, une conversation avec Farhad Khosrokhavar. Le Grand Continent. … Continue reading. For Azadeh Pourzand, a human rights researcher, gen-Z Iranians grew up watching their parents and grandparents’ failed attempts to seek change from within the state^[45]Ghobadi, P. (October 14, 2022). Iran protests: Iran’s Gen Z ‘realise life can be lived differently.’ BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63213745.. For Chirinne Ardakani, a French-Iranian lawyer, social media was the main tool for the Iranian diaspora to keep track of the government’s repression^[46]Chalom, S. (January 12, 2023). “Avocate le jour, je passe mes nuits à récolter des preuves des exactions du régime iranien.” Les Echos. … Continue reading. Recent protests have taken another dimension, young Iranians are able to speak to the world in a way that no previous generations could, and are able “know what life is like outside Iran.^[47]Chalom, S. (January 12, 2023). “Avocate le jour, je passe mes nuits à récolter des preuves des exactions du régime iranien.” Les Echos. … Continue reading”

By defying the Islamic State since the murder of Jina Amini in 2022, young women like Dina and Dunya Rad, who ate in a restaurant with no hijab, have been protesting by defying the core the hypermasculine model^[48]https://twitter.com/DinaRad86/status/1575618366596792320. And men have been supporting the movement by wearing a hijab in public spaces, such as students in universities of workers in pharmacies, breaking down the boundaries of masculinity^[49]Hidalgo, C. (March 16, 2023). Iran : des hommes portent le voile pour soutenir les femmes contre la politique stricte du régime. Le Figaro. … Continue reading.

Convergence of causes

While recent protests in Iran may be perceived as a by-product of an ongoing masculinity and gender roles crisis, many young men see it as an “opportunity for redefining masculinity and embracing more inclusive gender norms.^[50]Honarbin-Holliday, M. (2013). Emerging forms of masculinity in The Islamic Republic of Iran, p. 74.” Since 2022, men have increasingly supported women’s rights movements, with the most deaths resulting from protests being men. Yet, for Farid Vahid, co-director of the North Africa and Middle East Observatory, men’s mobilisation has also resulted from the convergence of causes^[51]Hidalgo, C. (March 16, 2023). Iran : des hommes portent le voile pour soutenir les femmes contre la politique stricte du régime. Le Figaro.. Protesting against the mandatory hijab laws and women’s oppression became a symbol of the fight for democracy, and a characteristic of Iranian masculinity. Women chant “Man Homeland Prosperity”, while men respond with “Woman Life Freedom”.

The statements in this article are the sole responsibility of the author.

To quote this production : Emma Beilouny (2023). Iranian masculinity: a political tool across the centuries. Gender in Geopolitics Institute. https://igg-geo.org/?p=14870&lang=en