Georgia: LGBTQIA+ rights put to the test by an anti-Western turn

Estelle Houtart

Translated by: Heloïse Gaud-Morel

13/04/25

On 17 September 2024, the Georgian parliament adopted a legislative package on ‘family values and child protection’. This legislative package explicitly targets the rights of sexual and gender minorities by imposing measures that seriously undermine those rights^[1]Perović, J. (2024). Georgia at a Crossroads. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 349. … Continue reading. It notably imposes a ban on “homosexual propaganda”, the censorship of films, books and sources of information on LGBTQIA+ people^[2]Désigne les personnes lesbiennes, gays, bisexuelles, trans, queer, intersexes, asexuelles ou toute personne ne se reconnaissant pas dans les normes hétérosexuelles et cisgenres., the non-recognition of same-sex couples, the ban on gender-affirming surgery and the requirement to indicate the ‘biological sex’ on administrative documents and employment contracts, etc.^[3]ILGA-Europe. (2024, September 18). Statement: The President of Georgia must not sign “On Family Values and the Protection of Minors” legislative package into law. … Continue reading

Since 2012, Georgian Dream, the ruling party, has pursued this anti-LGBTQIA+ policy. Founded by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, the party originally followed a liberal and pro-Western agenda^[4]Perović, J. (2024). Georgia at a Crossroads. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 349. … Continue reading. Since then, the party has reversed its position. Its repressive policies, along with its recent decision to suspend European Union (EU) accession talks until 2028, have fuelled ongoing mass protests and deepening political turmoil in Georgia. The same party that won the elections held on 26 October is also contesting the election of former football player Mikheil Kavelashvili as Georgia’s new president. When she was still president, the pro-European Salomé Zourabichvili refused to sign the legislative package on family values and child protection (hereafter referred to as ‘family values laws’), which was nevertheless enacted^[5]Le Monde avec AFP. (2024, October 3). En Géorgie, la loi restreignant les droits LGBTQIA+ promulguée par le président du Parlement. Le Monde.fr. … Continue reading. Tensions between the Georgian government and Salomé Zourabichvili had already intensified in spring 2024, when she refused to sign the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law (hereafter referred to as the ‘foreign influence’ law). The adoption of this law, which requires associations and media receiving more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register as organisations ‘bearing the interests of a foreign power’^[6]ILGA-Europe. (2024, September 18). Statement: The President of Georgia must not sign “On Family Values and the Protection of Minors” legislative package into law. … Continue reading had already sparked the first wave of protests in the Georgian capital^[7]Perović, J. (2024). Georgia at a Crossroads. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 349. … Continue reading.

Georgia is now at a significant geopolitical turning point and in the international spotlight. Yet the country was considered a model of democracy for the region^[8]Ibid. e and had demonstrated pro-European leanings that led it to obtain the candidate status for the EU in 2023^[9]Delcour, L. (2024). Un changement de paradigme ? L’Union européenne et l’Eurasie depuis la guerre en Ukraine, in de Tinguy, A. (dir.), Regards sur l’Eurasie. L’année politique 2023. Les … Continue reading. The Georgian Dream party is now being accused of growing closer to Russia by backtracking on its promises to join the EU. Could the Georgian government’s anti-LGBTQIA+ leanings reflect its broader anti-Western agenda? Within these political dynamics, LGBTQIA+ rights are highly polarising and appear to be acting as a battleground between the EU and Georgian nationalists.

Back-and-forth between the Georgian government and the European Union

Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia went through several years of turmoil marked by civil war. Meanwhile, more and more Georgians were turning towards the West, and, in 2003, the Rose Revolution established Georgia as a democratic model in the ex-Soviet Union^[10]Perović, J. (2024). Georgia at a Crossroads. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 349. … Continue reading. Indeed, the country had already significantly strengthened its ties with the EU by signing an Association Agreement in 2014. This agreement included a free-trade area, and Georgia negotiated visa liberalisation^[11]Ibid.. On this basis, and following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Georgia resubmitted its application for EU membership, alongside Moldova and, shortly after, Ukraine^[12]Delcour, L. (2024). Un changement de paradigme ? L’Union européenne et l’Eurasie depuis la guerre en Ukraine. In de Tinguy, A. (dir.), Regards sur l’Eurasie. L’année politique 2023. Les … Continue reading. The European Council officially granted Georgia the candidate country status in December 2023^[13]Ibid.. 

However, less than a year later, on 28 November 2024, the Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Kobakhidze, announced that he was postponing the EU accession process until 2028, which marked a significant reversal^[14]La rédaction (2024, November 29). Géorgie : le gouvernement reporte sa demande d’adhésion à l’Union européenne. Le club des juristes. … Continue reading. Georgian anti-Western leanings started with the infamous ‘foreign influence’ law, strongly inspired by a similar Russian law that has already been copied by several authoritarian-leaning governments such as Hungary, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan^[15]Perović, J. (2024). Georgia at a Crossroads. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 349. … Continue reading. This is the law that requires associations and media receiving more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register as organisations serving the interests of a foreign power^[16]ILGA-Europe. (2024, September 18). Statement: The President of Georgia must not sign “On Family Values and the Protection of Minors” legislative package into law. … Continue reading. However, human rights organisations, especially those focusing on LGBTQIA+ rights, receive most of their funding from Western sources, such as the EU. As such, they are among the government’s primary targets^[17]Luciani, L. (2021). Where the Personal is (Geo)Political: Performing Queer Visibility in Georgia in the Context of EU Association. Problems of Post-Communism, 70(2), 197–208. … Continue reading. 

Anti-democratic and deeply anti-Western in symbolic terms, the ‘foreign influence’ law can certainly be considered as ‘the beginning of the end’ of the promises to join the EU that were initially supported by the Georgian Dream party in 2012^[18]Perović, J. (2024). Georgia at a Crossroads. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 349. … Continue reading. It is also the cause of the mass protests in summer 2024 that took place in the streets of the Georgian capital. After the ‘foreign influence’ and ‘family values’ laws, the elections on 26 October were widely contested. For Civil Georgia, ‘the Georgian Dream stole the country’s parliamentary election as part of its broader assault on Georgia’s constitutional order’^[19]Gutbrod, H. (2024, December 7). Defending the Future: Understanding Georgia’s Fall Protests. Civil Georgia. https://civil.ge/archives/642540. In line with international observers^[20]Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2024, October 25). Georgia, Parliamentary Elections, 26 October 2024: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. … Continue reading, the media also reports allegations of vote-buying and breaching of voter ballot secrecy and mass intimidation^[21]Gutbrod, H. (2024, December 7). Defending the Future: Understanding Georgia’s Fall Protests. Civil Georgia. https://civil.ge/archives/642540. EU flags are now frequently visible during the mass protests that are still happening in Georgia: a significant symbol.

Human rights in European Union accession negotiations

Meanwhile, the EU was also quick to express its disapproval of Georgia’s authoritarian and anti-Western shift. In June 2024, the European Council had decided to suspend Georgia’s candidacy^[22]Conseil européen. Géorgie. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/policies/eu-georgia-relations/ following the adoption of the ‘foreign influence’ law. The European Council reiterated its position in October, after the adoption of the ‘family values’ laws, aligning it with that of the European Commission.

These calls to order illustrate how important human rights are in the negotiation process for joining the EU. The accession criteria, called ‘Copenhagen Criteria’, established by the Copenhagen European Council, are classified into three categories^[23]European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). Conditions for membership. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/conditions-membership_en : political^[24]Les critères politiques renvoient à la stabilité des institutions politiques à assurer la démocratie, l’Etat de droit, les droits humains et la protection des minorités., economic^[25]Les critères économiques renvoient à la capacité à faire face à la concurrence du marché intérieur de l’Union. and ‘acquis communautaire’ (or ‘Community acquis’)^[26]Les critères concernant l’acquis communautaire renvoient à la transposition, dans la législation nationale, de l’ensemble du droit européen en vigueur.. Political criteria are also found in the Treaty on European Union, Articles 49 and 2, which make respect for and promotion of the EU’s fundamental values conditions for accession. First set out in 1993, the Copenhagen Criteria are also an integral part of the accession negotiations. However, these criteria remain relatively abstract, and their specific content has only been clarified through reports and through other policy documents produced by the EU since then^[27]T. Marktler. (2006, December). The Power of the Copenhagen Criteria. Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, 2(2), 343-363. https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/44723.

In concrete terms, Georgia was granted candidate status only on condition that it made progress on the nine ‘priorities’ identified by the European Commission in its 2023 report on Georgia^[28]Conseil européen. Géorgie. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/policies/eu-georgia-relations/. Among others, these priorities include anti-corruption campaigns, fairer electoral systems, judicial reform, protection of media independence, ‘de-oligarchisation’ of economic and political spheres and better protection of the fundamental rights of vulnerable groups. For example, the European Commission calls for better prosecution of perpetrators and instigators of violence against these groups^[29]European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). (2023, Novembre 8). Georgia Report 2023, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report-2023_en ; A titre de … Continue reading. For the purposes of this article, it is worth noting that the Commission explicitly mentioned the violence committed during the Tbilisi Pride marches in July 2021 and July 2023. It urged Georgia to make efforts to ensure freedom of association and expression during these events. It also specifies that the new human rights action plan adopted by Georgia must also guarantee respect for the rights of LGBTQIA+ individuals^[30]Ibid.. 

Far from following these recommendations, Georgia has instead deviated from them. This situation explains why the EU quickly decided to suspend accession negotiations. In the 2024 report, released last October, the Commission strongly condemned the adoption of the ‘foreign influence’ law. It described the law as undermining freedom of association and expression, the right to privacy, the right to participate in public affairs, and the prohibition of discrimination^[31]European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). (2024, October 30). Georgia Report 2024, p. 26. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report-2024_en. The commission also explicitly addresses the adoption of the ‘family values’ laws. It criticised their role in increasing hate speech and in creating an ‘increasingly hostile and stigmatising atmosphere’ for LGBTIQ people. It also criticised the lack of ‘prior public consultations’ and the lack of ‘a thorough analysis of the compliance with European and international standards’^[32]Ibid., p. 25.. 

To support this idea of European and international standards, the Commission often aligns itself with other international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, hereafter referred to as the OSCE. Georgia has been a member of these organisations since 1999 and 1992, respectively.

In its 2024 report on Georgia, the Commission makes around fifteen references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. It also makes around forty references to the Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of Europe. The latter published two opinions on Georgia within a month of each other: one on the “foreign influence” law^[33]Venice Commission. (2024, June 21-22). Georgia – Urgent Opinion on the Law of Georgia on Transparency of Foreign Influence, issued on 21 May 2024, pursuant to Article 14a of the Venice … Continue reading and the other on the “family values” laws^[34]Venice Commission. (2024, June 21-22). Géorgie – Avis sur le projet de loi constitutionnelle sur la protection des valeurs familiales et des mineurs, adopté par la Commission de Venise lors … Continue reading,  In both cases, it recommended abandoning the laws. As regards the OSCE, the preliminary conclusions of its observation mission during the 2024 parliamentary elections are regularly cited. These conclusions highlight, in particular, breaches of vote secrecy and procedural inconsistencies, as well as intimidation and pressure exerted on voters^[35]Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2024, October 25). Georgia, Parliamentary Elections, 26 October 2024: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. … Continue reading. 

Although European standards are defined by multiple organisations, this article seeks to highlight how the EU uses them in its geopolitical relations to promote the “Europeanisation” of its neighbouring countries. According to Ukrainian researcher Maryna Shevtsova, the EU uses three mechanisms of Europeanisation: ‘conditionality, persuasion and capacity building’^[36]Shevtsova, M. (2020). Fighting “Gayropa”: Europeanization and Instrumentalization of LGBTI Rights in Ukrainian Public Debate. Problems of Post-Communism, 67(6), 500–510. … Continue reading. According to Shevtsova, conditionality is the preferred mechanism in the accession negotiations. It places candidate countries within a logic of sanctions and rewards that pushes them to meet the requirements. She explains that this instrument is used in the context of trade agreements and visa liberalisation agreements^[37]Ibid.. As for persuasion, it refers to the promotion of a progressive ‘global model’ that influences the adoption of community standards. Finally, the capacity building addresses financial, technical and political assistance policies offered to the national structures to enable them to become drivers of change themselves^[38]Ibid..

LGBTQIA+ rights, a factor of alterity between East and West

LGBTQIA+ rights occupy a central place in the geopolitical use of European standards. To cite just two examples, in 2015, Ukraine adopted its first law relating to LGBTQIA+ rights, which prohibited discrimination in employment on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity^[39]Ibid.. According to the media EUobserver, this was adopted ‘to please Brussels’^[40]Teffer. (2015, Novembre 13). Ukraine gives equal rights to gay workers, to please Brussels. euobserver. https://euobserver.com/lgbti/131098. Indeed, several parliamentarians publicly stated that they had supported the law ‘more out of necessity than conviction’^[41]Shevtsova, M. (2020). Fighting “Gayropa”: Europeanization and Instrumentalization of LGBTI Rights in Ukrainian Public Debate. Problems of Post-Communism, 67(6), 500–510. … Continue reading as it was a precondition imposed by the EU in negotiations on visa liberalisation^[42]Teffer. (2015, Novembre 13). Ukraine gives equal rights to gay workers, to please Brussels. euobserver. https://euobserver.com/lgbti/131098. The EU had already used the visa liberalisation as leverage back in 2012 to dissuade the Ukrainian parliament, which, like Russia — and now Georgia — was considering a law criminalising  ‘homosexual propaganda’^[43]Shevtsova, M. (2020). Fighting “Gayropa”: Europeanization and Instrumentalization of LGBTI Rights in Ukrainian Public Debate. Problems of Post-Communism, 67(6), 500–510. … Continue reading. The second example, discussed in the literature, is the way in which a state’s ability to organise a Pride march has become a decisive test^[44]Luciani, L. (2021). Where the Personal is (Geo)Political: Performing Queer Visibility in Georgia in the Context of EU Association. Problems of Post-Communism, 70(2), 197–208. … Continue reading. As part of Serbia’s accession negotiations, the EU reviews the success of Belgrade Pride each year. According to researcher Koen Slootmaeckers, this assessment focuses on the event itself, without necessarily examining whether the country has genuinely improved the lived experiences of local LGBTQIA+ people^[45]K. Slootmaeckers, (2017). The litmus test of pride: analysing the emergence of the Belgrade “Ghost” pride in the context of EU accession. East European Politics, 33(4), 517–535. … Continue reading. 

Shevtsova emphasises that, although conditionality policies have certainly encouraged reforms in countries seeking closer relations with the EU, these reforms have often stemmed from a ‘top-down’ bureaucratic process that has failed to bring about lasting changes in local attitudes^[46]Shevtsova, M. (2020). Fighting “Gayropa”: Europeanization and Instrumentalization of LGBTI Rights in Ukrainian Public Debate. Problems of Post-Communism, 67(6), 500–510. … Continue reading. Returning to the example of Belgrade Pride, the march’s extremely heavy security arrangements made it almost invisible to the wider public due to the continuing threat posed by counter-protesters. As a result, it was first described as a “state” of Pride and later as a “ghost” of Pride. Local activists eventually distanced themselves from the event, as they felt that it did not genuinely represent them^[47]K. Slootmaeckers, (2017). The litmus test of pride: analysing the emergence of the Belgrade “Ghost” pride in the context of EU accession. East European Politics, 33(4), 517–535. … Continue reading. Moreover, by consistently associating LGBTQIA+ rights with European values and standards, the EU may have contributed to their “Europeanisation”^[48]Ibid.. Homophobic political actors and discourses dangerously mobilise this association, framing themselves as symbols of resistance against the imposition of European norms. As a result, advances in LGBTQIA+ rights are perceived as the outcome of a bureaucratic process, leading local attitudes to resist them, as norms are imposed by a pro-Western elite^[49]Ziemer, U., and Roberts, S. P. (2024). Populist political masculinities, gender equality, and norm contestation in Armenia and Georgia. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 26(4), 804. … Continue reading.  

This ‘Europeanisation’ of sexual and gender minority rights has been largely fuelled by the Kremlin’s anti-Western propaganda, which portrays Russia as the defender of traditional values and of a sacred model of the family^[50]Oleg, R. and Ryabova, T. (2014, February 5). The decline of Gayropa? How Russia intends to save the world. Eurozine. https://www.eurozine.com/the-decline-of-gayropa/. The Russian neologism “Gayropa” characterises this discourse, framing LGBTQIA+ rights as a fundamental marker of otherness between East and West and conflating pro-European activism with “pro-gay” activism^[51]Luciani, L. (2021). Where the Personal is (Geo)Political: Performing Queer Visibility in Georgia in the Context of EU Association. Problems of Post-Communism, 70(2), 197–208. … Continue reading. This dual East/West and anti-/pro-LGBTQ dichotomy reinforces the idea of an irreconcilable opposition between two value systems. For countries undergoing accession procedures, as well as for the EU’s entire eastern neighbourhood, political homophobia^[52]Ici utilisé comme terme générique pour désigner la haine à l’égard des personnes LGBTQIA+. combined with masculinist discourses fuelled by the region’s growing militarisation of the region^[53]Ziemer, U., and Roberts, S. P. (2024). Populist political masculinities, gender equality, and norm contestation in Armenia and Georgia. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 26(4), 800-803. … Continue reading, has become a powerful nationalist or anti-Western tool^[54]Luciani, L. (2021). Where the Personal is (Geo)Political: Performing Queer Visibility in Georgia in the Context of EU Association. Problems of Post-Communism, 70(2), 197–208. … Continue reading.

This dual dichotomy has also had consequences on feminist movements. Georgian researcher Tamar Tskhadadze explains, for example, that the ‘Western norm’ plays a significant role in Georgian political debates, particularly on issues relating to the emancipation of women and sexual and gender minorities^[55]Tskhadadze, T. (2017). “”The West” and Georgian “Difference”: Discursive Politics of Gender and Sexuality in Georgia”. In Gender in Georgia. Feminist Perspectives on Culture, Nation, … Continue reading. In addition, there is a sense of European destiny that was supposedly stolen during the years of Soviet occupation and which would explain Georgia’s ‘years of delay’ compared to the West^[56]Ibid.. However, Tskhadadze adds that associating feminism and progressivism with the West tends to hide the Marxist and communist origins of several Georgian feminist movements. It also overlooks the fact that major international agreements on women’s rights were mainly promoted by countries in the ‘Eastern Bloc’, as shown by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), as well as the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action^[57]Ibid..

Consequences for Georgian politics

After decriminalising homosexuality in 2000, Georgia has gradually adopted increasingly LGBTQIA+-friendly legislation. The central role of the ‘Western norm’ in liberal discourse has undoubtedly contributed to these developments^[58]Tskhadadze, T. (2017). “”The West” and Georgian “Difference”: Discursive Politics of Gender and Sexuality in Georgia”. In Gender in Georgia. Feminist Perspectives on Culture, Nation, … Continue reading. However, some of these changes are primarily the result of conditionality mechanisms, as shown by the examples discussed above. Indeed, the EU used its diplomatic leverage to secure the adoption of the 2014 anti-discrimination law, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, during negotiations on the Association Agreement and visa liberalisation^[59]Luciani, L. (2021). Where the Personal is (Geo)Political: Performing Queer Visibility in Georgia in the Context of EU Association. Problems of Post-Communism, 70(2), 197–208. … Continue reading. The strong reaction of Georgian conservatives to this reform even led the EU to publish a document aimed at debunking certain myths, including the idea that Georgia was being forced to legalise same-sex marriage (Ibid. ; Füle, S. (European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy) (2014, March 4). EU-Georgia: About myths and true benefits of Association Agreement. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/speech_14_180/SPEECH_14_180_EN.pdf)).  

Moreover, while it is difficult to truly identify the influences at play, it appears that Georgia’s anti-LGBTQIA+ policies are strongly inspired by similar Russian policies. Despite significant tensions between Georgia and Russia, contacts between the two countries remain substantial. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the government of Georgia supported international condemnation, but it refused to impose economic sanctions on Moscow^[60]Merlin, A. (2024). La Géorgie à l’heure de l’invasion de l’Ukraine : le dissensus entre pouvoir et société. In de Tinguy, A. (dir.), Regards sur l’Eurasie. L’année politique 2023. … Continue reading. Georgia was therefore suspected of pursuing a strategy that would enable Russia to circumvent Western sanctions^[61]Perović, J. (2024). Georgia at a Crossroads. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 349. … Continue reading. Anti-LGBTQIA+ movements in Georgia have also adopted the Russian rhetoric, justifying political homophobia through the need to preserve national and religious values against the ‘decadent’ Western value system^[62]Luciani, L. (2021). Where the Personal is (Geo)Political: Performing Queer Visibility in Georgia in the Context of EU Association. Problems of Post-Communism, 70(2), 197–208. … Continue reading. This political homophobia is also linked to a nationalist identity construct that presents alternative identities as ‘enemies’ of the country^[63]Ziemer, U., and Roberts, S. P. (2024). Populist political masculinities, gender equality, and norm contestation in Armenia and Georgia. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 26(4), 800-803. … Continue reading. It often leads to acts of violence, such as in 2013 when around a hundred activists gathered for the International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia, were attacked by counter-protesters led by an Orthodox religious leader^[64]Luciani, L. (2021). Where the Personal is (Geo)Political: Performing Queer Visibility in Georgia in the Context of EU Association. Problems of Post-Communism, 70(2), 197–208. … Continue reading or in 2019 when Tbilisi’s first Pride march had to be called off after 30 minutes due to threats^[65]Ibid..  The following Pride marches were also marked by a large amount of violence, and the 2024 Pride march was even cancelled for security reasons^[66]ILGA-Europe. (2024, September 18). Statement: The President of Georgia must not sign “On Family Values and the Protection of Minors” legislative package into law. … Continue reading. In this context, the rushed adoption of the ‘family values’ laws a few weeks before the October elections clearly appears to be an attempt by the Georgian Dream political party to capitalise on these prevailing nationalist discourses for electoral purposes. In fact, Irakli Kobakhidze used the nationalist argument to justify postponing accession negotiations, claiming that the EU’s requirements were undignified and threatened Georgia’s traditional values^[67]EURACTIV France avec AFP. (2024, Novembre 29). Géorgie: la police tire des gaz lacrymogènes contre des manifestants pro-UE. Euractiv. … Continue reading.  

Although the dual East/West and anti-/pro-LGBT dichotomy fuels homophobia in Georgia, some authors also show how LGBTQIA+ activists navigate the growing politicisation of their rights. According to the researcher Laura Luciani, the ‘decisive test’ that Pride events now represent for the EU is influencing Georgian activist strategies^[68]Luciani, L. (2021). Where the Personal is (Geo)Political: Performing Queer Visibility in Georgia in the Context of EU Association. Problems of Post-Communism, 70(2), 197–208. … Continue reading. She quotes an organiser of the first Tbilisi Pride march, who argues that the pursuit of international visibility was part of a strategy to pressure the Georgian government^[69]Ibid.. This approach reportedly forced the government to mobilise the police to protect the protestors, a measure it would otherwise never have taken^[70]Ibid..  The politicisation of LGBTQIA+ rights therefore creates new opportunities for activist mobilisation and enables alliances with pro-Western political parties^[71]Shevtsova, M. (2020). Fighting “Gayropa”: Europeanization and Instrumentalization of LGBTI Rights in Ukrainian Public Debate. Problems of Post-Communism, 67(6), 500–510. … Continue reading. Nevertheless, another strategy reported by a Ukrainian LGBTQIA+ organisation consists in reluctantly remaining ‘invisible’ in pro-European movements^[72]Ibid..

Conclusion 

The adoption of the ‘family values’ laws is therefore part of the increasingly anti-Western trajectory of the Georgian Dream ruling party. The ‘foreign influence’ law, introduced by this same government a few months earlier, had already marked the end of the party’s initial promises in 2012 to join the EU^[73]Perović, J. (2024). Georgia at a Crossroads. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 349. … Continue reading. This law also sparked widespread anger within civil society, supported by the president at the time, Salomé Zourabichvili. Since the contested elections on 26 October, protests have continued in an increasingly repressive environment in Georgia. Irakli Kobakhidze, the Prime Minister, denies all allegations made about the elections and reinforces his authoritarian policy by imposing heavy sanctions on acts of protest^[74]EURACTIV France avec AFP. (2024, Novembre 29). Géorgie: la police tire des gaz lacrymogènes contre des manifestants pro-UE. Euractiv. … Continue reading.

The EU now finds itself in a difficult position. Protesters expect strong measures from the EU, having made it a symbol of freedom and a better future^[75]Gutbrod, H. (2024, December 7). Defending the Future: Understanding Georgia’s Fall Protests. Civil Georgia. https://civil.ge/archives/642540. Indeed, its human rights agenda requires it to express its disagreement and justifies sanctions such as suspending Georgia’s accession process. The European Parliament has also adopted a resolution calling for new elections to be held within a year under reinforced international supervision^[76]Silenská, N. (2024, December 17). Élections en Géorgie : la Slovaquie accuse le Parlement européen d’« ingérence ». Euractiv. … Continue reading. More substantial sanctions against Georgian authorities were also proposed but were blocked by vetoes from Slovakia and Hungary^[77]Ibid..

The situation is particularly delicate because, by repeatedly relying on a logic of sanctions and rewards in its Eastern Partnership, the EU is contributing to the nationalist discourses that accuse it of blackmail^[78]Ibid.. Its policy that promotes LGBTQIA+ rights is particularly targeted. The EU’s strategy could certainly be improved by focusing on the needs and primary demands of local communities, rather than imposing abstract standards without taking into consideration the specific context and how they are being received^[79]Luciani, L. (2021). Where the Personal is (Geo)Political: Performing Queer Visibility in Georgia in the Context of EU Association. Problems of Post-Communism, 70(2), 197–208. … Continue reading.

Such a strategy would be more in line with a capacity-building mechanism than a conditionality or persuasion mechanism. In other words, the aim would no longer be ‘Europeanisation’ but simply to support local activist movements in implementing their own priorities. However, this strategy faces significant barriers. The first is the ‘foreign influence’ law, which specifically targets civil society organisations that receive funding from abroad. Today, the priority is, therefore, at the very best, to ensure the safety of these activists by granting them asylum and, ideally, to find strategic solutions to empower them. 

Furthermore, the rise of the far right within the European Commission does not necessarily suggest that the EU will continue to promote LGBTQIA+ rights in the future. For now, the pursuit of its geopolitical agenda on human rights does not seem to be slowing down. Nevertheless, authoritarian trends are growing worldwide, including within several EU countries. It will therefore be important to examine whether the EU’s use of LGBTQIA+ rights as a diplomatic tool reflects genuine support for LGBTQIA+ people or rather a more “homonationalist” policy. 

The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author.

To cite this article: Estelle Houtart, « Géorgie : les droits LGBTQIA+ à l’épreuve d’un tournant anti-occidental », 13.04.2025, Institut du Genre en Géopolitique, https://igg-geo.org/2025/04/13/georgie-les-droits-lgbtqia-a-lepreuve-dun-tournant-anti-occidental/