Temps de lecture : 14 minutes

POLAND : YOU SAID “ABORTION”? I SAY “REVOLUTION”!

16.01.2020

Written by Natasza QUELVENNEC

Translated by Bertille Fitamant

“September 21, 2016 marked the beginning of feminism in Poland”, started philosopher Ewa Majewska in her article^[1]Majewska E., Słaby opór i siła bezsilnych. #Czarnyprotest kobiet w Polsce w 2016, [Faible résistance et puissance des impuissants. #Czarnyprotest des femmes en Pologne en 2016], Academia. URL: … Continue reading referencing the date when the hashtag #CzarnyProtest (#BlackProtest) first appeared. It started the beginning of an unprecedented mobilisation of Polish women who are against the abortion ban. Revived to an even greater extent in 2020, Polish feminism has a new face: younger, more radical and united beyond “the spaces of women’s cause”^[2]Bereni L., De la cause à la loi. Les mobilisations pour la parité politique en France (1992-2000), 2007, Thesis in political sciences, Paris-I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, University.

The rise to power of the ultraconservative party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS Law and Justice) constitutes a breaking point in Poland’s contemporary history. The terms used by the pro-democracy activists to answer the question on the reasons of their involvement starting in 2015, are unambiguous : “shock”, “earthquake”, “irony of history”, “end of the world”. This observation is also shared by the international community which considered the countries part of the Visegrad Group^[3]The informal group of four Central European countries : Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia as the “pioneers of a successful supposed transition from state socialism to liberal democracy and market economy”^[4]Müller J.-W., Qu’est-ce que le populisme?, Paris, Gallimard, 2007, p.11. Poland in particular was a model student on the road to democratic transition in the eyes of European partners and friends^[5]Potel J.-Y., « La Pologne, miroir de l’Europe ? », Esprit, vol. mars, no. 3, 2019, pp. 41-49.

This change in political direction was marked by the intensification of rhetoric and policies aimed at what power, close to the Catholic church, called “the gender ideology”, a term originating in the theologies of women and the body by John Paul II, reaffirmed by Pope Benedict XVI and Pope Francis^[6]Kuhar R., Paternotte D. (dir.), Campagnes anti-genre en Europe. Des mobilisations contre l’égalité, 2008, Lyon : Presses universitaires de Lyon, coll. « SXS Sexualités ». This split, which echoes the redefinition of the national community by populists, divides society in two antagonistic groups: “us” – defenders of the national sovereignty and the Catholic culture of the “true people”, and “them” – international elites who are supporters of gender mainstreaming, feminists and sexual minorities^[7]Müller, op.cit., Kuhar, Paternotte, Dauphin S., et Sénac-Slawinski R. (2008), « Gender mainstreaming : analyse des enjeux d’un ‘concept-méthode’. Introduction », Cahiers du Genre, vol. … Continue reading.

The government’s attack on the right to abortion

The bill for the ban of abortion, which is already very restrictive in terms of access^[8]Since 1993, abortion is only allowed in three circumstances : pregnancy resulting from an illegal act, risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman, serious malformation of the fetus., was one of the first measures considered in the Polish Parliament in 2016. Women’s reactions were immediate: the #BlackProtest, an unprecedented collective mobilisation after the fall of communism in 1989, forced the government to back down. Researcher Majewska emphasised its massive nature (“national, and even international, mobilisation of women […] for our rights^[9]Majewska, op.cit.”), inclusive (“sharing a picture in black and white, participating in a demonstration or expressing your support for women on the internet or in the streets were forms of action accessible to all^[10]Majewska, op.cit.”), marked by the awareness to act (“each one of us had a feeling of agency because every picture mattered^[11]Majewska, op.cit.”) and global (recognising “a problem from a social category [that is, women of childbearing age] as a problem that concerns us all^[12]Majewska, op.cit.”).

This stance contributed to the popularisation of the cause to Polish society which, faced with the massive nature of protests and the emergence of feminist ideas^[13]From 2016, feminist experts began to be invited to the media to comment on women’s protests. Public opinion on access to abortion begins to evolve after the 2016 protests. For an example, see: … Continue reading in the public space, began to take an interest in the subject after years of indifference^[14]Since 1993, many bills banning abortion completely have been introduced in Parliament, which, dominated until 2015 by Liberal forces, has always opposed it. During the examination of these bills, … Continue reading. Faced with widespread systematic protests as soon as he tries to restrict access to abortion through parliamentary channels, Jaroslaw Kaczynki^[15]The president of the Law and Justice party (PiS), previously a mere deputy, and Vice Prime Minister for a few weeks now, Kaczynski is considered the strategist and the number one decision-maker of … Continue reading changed his strategy in 2020. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, which limited the risk of collective mobilisations and legitimise their dispersal by the police (with public gatherings of more than five people being prohibited), he decided to tackle the problem through the courts. It is the Constitutional Court, the body in charge of examining the conformity of laws according to the Constitution and whose independence has been questioned since 2015 by the successive appointments of judges close to the power, which must decide. On October 22nd, 2020, the court held that “the legislator has a duty to ensure the protection of every human life^[16]For an example, see: https://www.lesechos.fr/monde/europe/pologne-le-tribunal-constitutionnel-restreint-encore-le-droit-a-lavortement-1258525” and, therefore, abortion cannot be allowed if prenatal testing reveals irreversible damage to the foetus. However, abortions performed in this case constitute 98% of all legal abortions. In fact, the judgment of the Constitutional Court is therefore similar to an absolute prohibition.

The response of civil society did not take long. On the evening of the same date, thousands of women gathered in front of the headquarters of the Constitutional Court. Despite the increasingly aggressive actions of the police, the attacks of the nationalists and the criticism of the violence of the protest even on the liberal side, their mobilisation does not falter. Just like in 2016, these actions take place in cities of all sizes and with an intergenerational nature. Revived to an even greater extent than #BlackProtest, Polish feminism in 2020 seems to have a new face: younger, more radical and united beyond “the spaces of women’s cause^[17]Bereni, op.cit.”.

Youth on the barricades

A simple observation of those gatherings allows for the detection of a new piece of data: people aged 15-30 seem very present, or even make up the majority of the processions, in contrast to the 2016 protests, which mobilised generations aged 40 and over. Some hypotheses can be used to explain it. Born afte
r the fall of communism, these young generations have never known any other political reality than that of liberal democracy, whose privileges seem already granted to them. In contrast to their older counterparts engaged in pro-democracy mobilisations from the days after PiS’s electoral victory, the youth, disenchanted by the very liberal economic leadership of the Civic Platform party which had been in power for eight years, seemed to trust PiS promising large social transfers^[18]For example, the 500+ program applies to families with at least two children. 500 zlotys (around 125 euros) per months and per child without condition of resources are allocated to them. The boost is … Continue reading.

Since then, their confidence crumbled. After five years of being in power and marked by unprecedented protests movements after 1989, PiS is no longer the newcomer, as was the case in 2015. The electoral trend among 18 to 29 year-olds reversed during the 2020 presidential election: PiS candidate Andrzej Duda, who was popular among young people in 2015 (61%), halved his score in this age category in 2020 (36%) to the benefit of the Civic Platform liberal candidate, Rafal Trzaskowski.

Beyond the “candidate for change” factor, the anti-European rhetoric, intensified in response to the implementation of the procedure relating to the violation of the rule of law^[19]Acts against the judicial system caused on December 20th, 2017, for the first time in the history of the EU, the triggering of Article 8 of the Treaty on the European Union. The European Commission … Continue reading, does not bode well with this electorate born in the European Union^[20]Bilewicz M. (2020), “Sloiki”, to nadzieja na zmiane polityczna w Polsce, [“City dwellers from the provinces, hope of political change in Poland], NOIZZ; available at: … Continue reading. The ideological war against gender declared by the PiS upon its arrival in power and the response of civil society are not insignificant in the development of the political orientation of the youngest. Women’s cause, which was strongly undermined by the measures of ultraconservative power^[21]Apart from the abortion ban bill, other measures detrimental to women have been taken: the cessation of public funding of ART or the issuance of the morning-after pill only by prescription. The … Continue reading, continued to spark new mobilisations throughout the five-year term. The narrative targeting sexual minorities is becoming increasingly present in the public space. A third of Polish municipalities called themselves “LGBT-free zones^[22]Anna Zielinska, De quoi les « zones libres d’idéologie LGBT » en Pologne sont-elles le nom ?, 17.10.2020, Le courrier d’Europe centrale, available at: … Continue reading”. During the presidential election campaign in 2020, President Andrzej Duda declared that LGBT people are not people, but an “ideology” compared to a kind of “neo-Bolshevism^[23]According to the Polish president, the “LGBT ideology” is “neo-Bolchevism”, 13 June 2020, Le Figaro, available at: … Continue reading”. In August 2020, demonstrations in support of Margot, a young LGBT activist who was being held in pre-trial detention, took place in major cities^[24]In Poland, thousands of protesters after the arrest of LGBT activist, Le Monde, 11 August 2020, available at: … Continue reading. The NGO Strajk Kobiet (Women’s strike), which was at the origin of the mobilisation against the abortion ban in 2016, is one of the organisers. Resulting from this combination of struggles, an alliance is created between feminists and youth organisations involved in these protests, including pro-LGBT activists, antifascists and anarchists.

Moreover, transnational trends, especially the #MeToo movement, has an influence on this awakening of feminist consciousness among young Polish women. A very lively debate notably took place in 2019 in reaction to the opposition of student at the Lodz Film School against a conference of former student, Polish-born filmmaker Roman Polanski, who is accused of sexual violence by a dozen women, some of whom were minors at the time of the incidents^[25]“Affaire Roman Polanski : quelles sont les accusations portées contre le réalisateur depuis 1977 ?”, 8 March 2020, FranceInfo URL: … Continue reading. Another factor seems to contribute to this generation renewal observed in the 2020 mobilisations: the progressive secularisation of Poland, particularly accentuated among younger people. In 2019, only 63% of high school students (almost 20% less than ten years ago), call themselves believers, against more than 90% of the general population. Only 28% participate in Sunday masses (50% of the general population)^[26]See: https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/religia/aktualnosci/cbos-polska-mlodziez-jest-coraz-mniej-religijna/p7kbxhn. Moreover, according to the Pew Research Center survey conducted in 2018 in 106 countries, Poland is the country that is becoming more secular the quickest. It is the first generation to be faced with catechism classes in public schools^[27]The concordat establishes catechism classes in public schools and the rules of conduct of the state, particularly in terms of “defending the lives of unborn children”., generations under the age of 40 turn away from the Church and, consequently, from the Catholic dogma when it comes to the “protection of the lives of unborn children^[28]“Young adults around the world are less religious by several measures”, 13 June 2018 URL: … Continue reading”.

“***** ***” and the Church

The radicalisation
of protests in 2020 is one of the differences that are observed compared to the 2016 mobilisation. It takes place both in the language register and in the register of protesting actions. The massive appearance of offensive terms, which were relatively rare or even absent from the 2016 protests, can be observed. On October 22^nd, 2020, the head of the procession, heading towards Kaczynski’s home, sported a giant banner that read “Wypiedalac” (“Go fuck yourself”), targeted at the power. Sung in unison, displayed on signs and on social medias by protesters in the following days, the slogan became the symbol of the mobilisation of 2020. Appearing in the form of eight stars (***** ***) and popularised by President Duda himself, who, ignoring the meaning of the symbol, is photographed with activists wearing it, the slogan “Jebac PiS” (“Fuck PiS”) experiences its second youth.

Feminists make the stars disappear. Chanted and plainly spelled out by the demonstrators among all generations,  it becomes viral both during the demonstrations and online. One of the faces of the feminist revolution, academic and poetess Inga Iwasiow, declares on October 23^rd at a demonstration: “Not as a professor, but as a woman, I tell you, fuck PiS and go fuck yourself. (…) I am speaking to public television, public radio and other propaganda devices of this regime: fuck you!^[29]Wobronie słów Ingi Iwasiów: „Nie jak profesorka, tylko jak kobieta powiem: jebać i wypierdalać”, 25 October 2020 ».

The language sphere is not the only one affected by the radicalisation phenomenon. New forms of actions are emerging. In response to the Bishops welcoming the Constitutional Court’s ruling, on Sunday October 25th, 2020, demonstrators shout their anger in front and inside the churches and/or write their frustration on their facades. A video shot in this context in a small town, showing very young women (probably high schoolers) talking to a priest, becomes viral. One of the teenage girls screams, gesticulates violently, and starts crying: “If someone rapes me, are you going to raise the child?(…) To be born in our time, to be a woman(…) is a condemnation^[30]see:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=49pBuXM4mYs”. Others shout^[31]see:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=49pBuXM4mYs :  “This, is Poland, not the Vatican!”, “Do you have a uterus? No, well, get out!”. Beyond a rampant secularisation of the younger generation that we already mentioned, these actions demonstrate the end of a taboo. Attacking a church or a priest in this country where the position of the Catholic religion is historically and culturally very strong, even for atheists^[32]The church plays an important unifying role beyond faith, replacing the state that did not exist for almost 200 years before the fall of communism in 1989. Poland was wiped off the map of Europe … Continue reading, is a breaking point.

What are the hypotheses that could explain the radicalisation of mobilisations in 2020? First of all, ever since the PiS party came to power, there has been a certain normalisation of rallies in public space as a form of political engagement. This is a new phenomenon in Poland, because ever since the fall of communism in 1989, this form of engagement is rare and mobilised only by certain occupational groups (miners and farmers). Facing the powerless parliamentary opposition against the voting “machine” of the majority and the non-governmental organisations mistreated by police repression and financial pressure, it is the only effective form of protest. It is what we are observing at the moment: issued more than three weeks ago, the ruling of the Constitutional Court is yet to be promulgated despite the legal obligation to do so without delay. This standardisation inevitably leads to a certain habit. The forms of protest must be more and more violent to have the desired effect: to attract the media and to make the political class react.

Secondly, the anger of women, who have been in the streets for the past five years, to defend, according to one of the respondents, “this status quo that satisfies no one^[33]Interview with one of the demonstrators conducted by the author of the article on October 29th 2020.”, is becoming more and more tangible. This anger is all the stronger that their cries are not heard by the political class. Only the left-wing coalition (credited with some 10% of the votes) explicitly included in its program the liberalisation of access to abortion^[34]“Robert Biedroń, l’inlassable partisan des droits des femmes et des LGBT en Pologne”,¸22 May 2020, available at: … Continue reading. Other opposition parties, including Civic Platform, the second largest political force after PiS, have evasive stances. In an interview, sociologist E. Korolczuk analyses the voices, on all sides of the political spectrum, that criticise the radicalisation and call for appeasement^[35]Klauzinski S. (2020), Politycznym dziadersom nie miesci sie w glowach, ze “nasze drogie panie” chca wladzy, [Political forefathers fail to understand that “our dear ladies” want power], … Continue reading.

In it, she sees a generational break in the representation of femininity, considered by those whom she calls the “forefathers” (not by age, but by the state of mind), as a personification of delicacy and fragility, in short, an antithesis of masculinity, determined and decisional. This vision no long matches with the needs and experiences of young women, who make up the majority in the processions.

YOU SAID “ABORTION” ? I SAY “REVOLUTION”!

The mobilisation is applauded by a large part of the population: 73%  do not approve the ruling of the Constitutional Court, 54% support the protests (this proportion rises to 80% among the voters of the opposition)^[36]Sondaż: Polacy negatywnie oceniają wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w sprawie aborcji available at: … Continue reading. The movement claiming first and foremost the access to abortion is entering a new dynamic as support and alliances evolve. Here and there, new socio-professional groups join the processions and support the demonstrations: farmers, taxi and transit drivers, teachers, entrepreneurs… The ruling of the Constitutional Court catalysed the anger that has been accumulated for several months: The anger at the ineffective management of the pandemic, the corruption of power, hate speech directed at all opponents of the regime and, of course, the war on sexual and reproductive rights.

Faced with this dynamic, t
he speeches of the organisers of the mobilisations are changing. Marta Lempart, the leader of the Women’s Strike, no longer talks about access to abortion, but about the government’s resignation. On November 2^nd, 2020, the organisation declares online: “Abortion has become the symbol of the fight for freedom. (…) Something more is happening. Something huge. We feel we have to assure you that nothing will be decided without you or behind your back..^[37]URL : https://natemat.pl/325463,postulaty-strajku-kobiet-dymisja-czarnka-i-inne-zadania-lista”. Inspired by the Belarusian model^[38]See “Après les élections du 9 août 2020, jugées frauduleuses, l’opposition biélorusse constitue le conseil de coordination, organe destiné à coordonner la passation pacifique du … Continue reading, the organisers created the Consultative Council, a body intended to gather the demands of the demonstrators affiliated with organisations and socio-professional groups supporting the protests. Many personalities from civil society or the political sphere are invited to join the council as experts in a dozen thematic fields: women’s rights, LGBTQIA+ rights, state secularity, rule of law, pandemic, climate, education, labour market, health… The revolution is underway.

The new face of Polish feminism, or more broadly pro-democracy activism, is no longer the same as in 2016. The renewal of generations, which early activists have aspired for for five years, is underway. Young people disappointed by anti-European rhetoric, hostile to attacks on sexual and reproductive rights and gradually turning away from the Church, take part in protesting, sometimes for the first time in their lives. Now almost daily and perceived as the only method of opposition, the protests are radicalised to avoid the pitfall of the standardisation of activist actions. Young women, who are at the head of processions, want to make their anger heard, even if it means shocking politicians who are walled up in the anachronistic vision of femininity. This new feminism is positioning itself as a gathering of pro-democracy activists and brings people together beyond its traditional cause.

However, at first glance, these timely alliances may prove to be disadvantageous in the long run. Won’t the revolution devour its own children? This question seems to be of particular importance in the context of Central and Western Europe countries whose democratic transition has not benefitted women^[39]Cirstocea I. (2013), « Transition / démocratisation » in Achin C. et al., Dictionnaire.Genre et sciences politiques, Paris, Presses de Sciences po. At the forefront of the Solidarnosc movement’s struggle, after 1989 Polish women were made invisible as actresses of democratic change^[40]Penn, S (2005), Solidarity’s Secret: The Women Who Defeated Communism in Poland, University of Michigan Press, excluded from public life^[41]Graff, A. (2008), Świat bez kobiet. Płeć w polskim życiu publicznym, [The world without women. Gender in Polish public life], Varsovie, Wydawnictwo W.A.B. and oppressed by policies on sexual and reproductive rights^[42]Gal S., Kligman G. (2004), “La politique de la reproduction dans les pays d’Europe Centrale et Orientale”, Nouvelles questions féministes, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 10-28. One can legitimately wonder whether this unifying feminism of 2020 will not be diluted in the broader repertoire of causes.

Bibliography

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Pour citer cet article : Natasza QUELVENNEC, “Pologne : vous avez dit “avortement” ? Moi, je dis “révolution” !”, 16.11.2020, Institut du Genre en Géopolitique.