When France would rather see jihadist women as victims

22.07.2022

Written by: Laura Jbara-Le Gourriérec

Translated by: Talia Gaudé

In 2016, the French intelligence services estimated that about 300 of the 700 French jihadists were women^[1]C. Béraud, C. Rostaing, C. de Galembert, “Genre et lutte contre la ‘radicalisation’. La gestion sexuée du ‘risque’ religieux en prison”, 02/2017, Cahiers du Genre, pages 145 à 165, … Continue reading. The male returnees^[2]Term used to designate the French jihadists returning to France. are systematically incarcerated, unlike their female counterparts: only three of the latter are in the Fresnes prison^[3]D. Thomson, Les Revenants, Editions Seuil, 2016, 294 pages.  https://www.franceinter.fr/monde/une-femme-francaise-detenue-en-syrie-etre-ici-c-est-comme-etre-morte. In the same year, some women tried to lead an attack in France. Representatives of the State and terrorism experts seem to suggest that both intelligence agencies and the French justice never believed women were able to lead such attacks and treated them as victims of Daesh^[4]Women and men have or wish to leave Daesh, after seeing and/or experiencing violence. However, it is not a general rule and a return to France is not always synonymous with an ideological break, as … Continue reading and secondary grade members of the group.

Certainly, Wahhabi^[5]“Wahhabism is an Islamic trend that aims to return to the sources of Islam, i.e., that wants Muslims to live as they did in the first century of Islam”. For more details, see: … Continue reading and Salafist^[6]According to the Larousse, Salafism is “a fundamentalist current of Islam, that advocates for a return to the pure religion of the ancients by resorting to a literal reading of the sources”. theologians adhere to a gendered social organization, wherein the role of the Muslim woman is to care for the home, while the man is supposed to protect her and sacrifice himself for the Prophet. Within Al-Qaeda, women have long been put in non-combat roles^[7]M. Abu Rumman, “Jihadist Woman: Role and Position Shift in Isis”, 2021, Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, … Continue reading.

However, violence is not inherently masculine: women have been involved in violent movements for decades^[8]F. Lahnait, “Femmes Kamikazes ou le Jihad au Féminin”, 04/2014, Tribune Libre – Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement, 14 pages. URL : … Continue reading. The terrorist woman is not a 21st-century revolution in Europe or the Middle East. In the 1980s, six women linked to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) carried out several attacks^[9]“Et la guérilla créa la femme-kamikaze”, Le Temps, 07/01/2016, https://www.letemps.ch/monde/guerilla-crea-femmekamikaze. At the same time, in Chechnya, the participation of women in combats is encouraged^[10]M. Abu Rumman, “Jihadist Woman: Role and Position Shift in Isis”, 2021, Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, … Continue reading by the leader of Saudi jihadist Samer Swailem^[11]Also known as Khattab.. In the 1990s, women from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka followed their example^[12]“Et la guérilla créa la femme-kamikaze”, Le Temps, 07/01/2016, https://www.letemps.ch/monde/guerilla-crea-femmekamikaze. Between 1985 and 2006, more than 200 women around the world were registered as kamikazes. In 2008, within four months, seventeen women successfully carried out suicide attacks, killing 130 people, and injuring 300 more^[13]F. Lahnait, “Femmes Kamikazes ou le Jihad au Féminin”, 04/2014, Tribune Libre – Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement, 14 pages. Even if their presence in jihadist groups is controversial, women are recruited for terrorist operations.

From that point on, how is it explained that France was taken by surprise in 2016? Did gender stereotypes lead the French State to underestimate the threat of jihadist women?

The existence of a feminine jihadist narrative: paradoxes and contemporary evolutions

In the 21^st century, kamikaze women are becoming more and more common. In 2000, Hawa Barayev was the author of a suicide car bombing in Grozny. In 2016, the Chechens used women again on three occasions^[14]“Et la guérilla créa la femme-kamikaze”, Le Temps, 07/01/2016, https://www.letemps.ch/monde/guerilla-crea-femmekamikaze, normalising active female participation. As the practice evolves, so does the theology and literature of Islamic and jihadist groups. In 2001, the Council of Senior Scholars, Saudi Arabia’s highest religious body, issued a fatwa^[15]According to the Larousse, a fatwa is “a legal advice given by a religious authority on a doubtful case or a new issue”. encouraging Palestinian women to become kamikazes. In 2004, Sheikh Yassin, spiritual leader of Hamas^[16]Killed in 2004 by an Israeli strike. and supporter of female kamikazes, stated that “women are like an army reserve: when it becomes useful, we use them” [free translation]^[17]« Les femmes sont comme une armée de réserve : quand cela devient utile, nous les utilisons ». “Et la guérilla créa la femme-kamikaze”, Le Temps, 07/01/2016, … Continue reading. Following that statement, three attacks linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were committed by women^[18]“Et la guérilla créa la femme-kamikaze”, Le Temps, 07/01/2016, https://www.letemps.ch/monde/guerilla-crea-femmekamikaze. In a text aimed at Muslim women^[19]Al-Rahman, “The Role of Women in Jihad by the martyred Shaykh, Al-Hafith Yusuf Bin Salih Al-‘Uyayri ”, U.A. 1429 AH (10 ou 11 Janvier 2008), Sada al-Malahim – the Jihad Base Organization … Continue reading, Yusuf al-Ayeri^[20]Also known as : Yusuf bin Salih bin Fahd al-Ayeri, al-Battar; killed by the Saudi forces in 2003., first leader of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, urges women who read it not to oppose the jihad^[21]The holy war. of the men in their entourage.  At the same time, he recognises that women have been present on the battlefield since Islam’s beginning and narrates their achievements (killings, suicides, etc…). In another of his texts^[22]“Did Eve commit suicide or martyred”, cité dans M. Abu Rumman, “Jihadist Woman: Role and Position Shift in Isis”, 2021, Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, … Continue reading, he allows women to carry out suicide attacks. His writings bear witness to the controversy that stirs up Islamic terrorist movements: “While some consider that anything is good to make the cause advance, others will deplore the fact that women are not confined to their primary roles and that they are in the limelight, when they should rather be operating “behind the scenes”” [free translation]^[23]« Si certains considèrent que tout est bon pour faire avancer la cause, d’autres déploreront le fait que les femmes ne se cantonnent pas à leurs rôles premiers et qu’elles soient sur le … Continue reading.

In 2005, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq^[24]Predecessor of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), known today as the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh., urged women to become active members of the organisation and personally chose those who would commit suicide on November 9^th of the same year^[25]M. Abu Rumman, “Jihadist Woman: Role and Position Shift in Isis”, 2021, Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, … Continue reading. This is a turning point for the female jihadist figure. The Islamic State will be brought to a similar turning point after establishing the Islamic Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in 2014. The organisation recruits a higher number of jihadists, including women. Their role is diversified^[26]T. Bak, “Les femmes terroristes de Daech”, 22/10/2021, Institut du Genre en Géopolitique, https://igg-geo.org/?p=5232#f+5232+3+6 et M. Abu Rumman, “Jihadist Woman: Role and Position Shift in … Continue reading until occasionally allowing them to become kamikazes. As of 2015, Daesh opened muaskar^[27]Training camps. for women^[28]D. Thomson, Les Revenants, Editions Seuil, 2016, 294 pages.^, and they claimed responsibility for attacks committed by women from 2016 onwards. With these evolutions in the limits imposed by the Sharia^[29]The Islamic law., a discourse of female jihadism is emerging and attracts more and more women, pushing them to take part in the jihad^[30]M. Abu Rumman, “Jihadist Woman: Role and Position Shift in Isis”, 2021, Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, … Continue reading. When they marry a jihadist, the young brides are given a Kalashnikov and an explosives belt^[31]D. Thomson, Les Revenants, Op.cit. and trained in using these weapons as a precautionary measure^[32]G. Casutt, “Quand le djihadiste est une femme”, 02/2018, Inflexions – Armée de terre, pages 87 à 96, https://www.cairn.info/revue-inflexions-2018-2-page-87.htm. However, some women wish for more: to be allowed to fight, to sacrifice themselves, and make dogmas^[33]Term used to refer to suicide bombings.. French women returnees share this desire^[34]D. Thomson, Les Revenants, Op.cit. and recognise that it is a way to be active in their lives, to have control and powe^[35]Ibid..

Furthermore, the evolution of the role of jihadist women is not to be taken as a form of feminism. They are not claiming equality and a revolution inside the organisation, they  wish to be allowed to prove their faith and defend their interpretation of Islam. The organisation they belong to, even if aware of the advantage they represent in the field, remains deeply patriarchal and firmly opposed to women’s emancipation. It is beneficial to use women in terrorist operations is beneficial, primarily because of gender biases present in many countries^[36]“Et la guérilla créa la femme-kamikaze”, Le Temps, 07/01/2016, https://www.letemps.ch/monde/guerilla-crea-femmekamikaze. They are less suspected than men, less often searched… Attacks by women are rare and directly contradict the stereotypes of male violence and the gentle, calm, victimised woman. Therefore, female suicide bombers attract more media attention, becoming a communication and recruitment tool for terrorists^[37]D. D. Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers, 2004, 18 pages..

These changes in the status of female jihadists were quickly taken into account by the United States of America. The American government started to seriously consider the threat these women pose, on foreign and national soil, in 2003^[38]Ibid.. In addition to this, there are clandestine training camps for women, notably in Nablus^[39]In Palestine/Cis-Jordan., and the arrest of female jihadists by Russia and Israel, mentioned by American researchers in 2004^[40]D. D. Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers, Op.cit.. This early awareness clashes with the French position.

For France, women victims, disempowered and non-dangerous

For a long time, France has just assumed that “women followed their husbands” [free translation]^[41]« Les femmes suivaient leur mari ». François Molins in an interview for Le Monde, 2016. See: … Continue reading. These women are perceived as mothers and wives and presented as such. This language reflects an assumed passivity on the part of these women, the idea that they are only collateral victims. French literature on women jihadists is recent, the majority of it having been published after 2015, while other international actors have recognized the threat they pose for over twenty years.

The French intelligence services, as well as the judiciary, have assumed that with its conservative and rigorous interpretation of Islam, advocating a gendered social hierarchy, the Islamic State could only encourage a purely masculine jihad, sexist all the way to its combat strategy. It seems inconceivable that women, born and educated in a French society that values gender equality and women’s rights, could voluntarily submit to Daesh and the Sharia law^[42]G. Casutt, “Quand le djihadiste est une femme”, 02/2018, Inflexions – Armée de terre, pages 87 à 96, https://www.cairn.info/revue-inflexions-2018-2-page-87.htm, and be the “engine of radicalization, and [that] some [are] more favourable to terrorist attacks than their husbands” [free translation]^[43]« Le moteur de la radicalisation, et [que] certaines [soient] plus favorables aux attentats que leurs époux ».  D. Thomson, Les Revenants, Op.cit.. Here, it is not even a possibility to consider that some women want to carry out these attacks. In France, as elsewhere, there is a difficulty in conceiving women as violent beings^[44]See the testimonies of the returnees in D. Thomson, Les Revenants, Editions Seuil, 2016, 294 pages.. Society is tempted to reduce them to victims, emotional creatures who suffer, while searching in their past for the traumatic event that may have led them to Daesh^[45]G. Casutt, “Quand le djihadiste est une femme”, 02/2018, Inflexions – Armée de terre, pages 87 à 96, https://www.cairn.info/revue-inflexions-2018-2-page-87.htm.

It was therefore believed that French women only had secondary roles within Daesh and represented a minimal danger. Those that returned to the national territory could have their identity papers seized, and maybe find themselves free under judicial supervision while awaiting a trial but remained overall much less supervised and judicialized than men^[46]D. Thomson, Les Revenants, Op.cit.. The impunity granted to them is representative of the lack of knowledge and understanding of the historical and practical reality of the role of jihadist women, as well as the Islam and Quran, which allow women to take part in the jihad if necessary^[47]D. D. Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers, Op.cit.. The result is that in 2013 and 2015, the typical profile of the jihadist is still that of a man^[48]A. Roblain, B. Malki, “Djihadistes, tous les mêmes ? Analyse psychosociale du profil des djihadistes européens et des problématiques sécuritaires qu’ils posent en Occident”, 01/2015, … Continue reading, and no mention is made of the danger that women represent^[49]“Combattants européens en Syrie: l’Europe prépare une réplique”, Le Monde avec AFP, 07/06/2013, … Continue reading. Their radicalism is underestimated until it is acted upon.

The impact of the attempted attack by women in 2016: the new French strategy and its limitations

In September 2016, a group of women attempted to carry out a car bombing at Notre-Dame in Paris. Suddenly, France realised that the typical terrorist is not always a man, that he can be a “she” and be named Amel, Inès, Sarah, Ornella, Samia, Selima^[50]Amel Sakaou, Inès Madani, Sarah Hervouët, Ornella Gilligmann, Samia Chalel and Selima Aboudi were tried and sentenced in 2019, alongside Rachid Kassim and Mohammed Lamine Aberouz for their … Continue reading… Jean-Charles Brisard, president of the Center for Analysis of Terrorism^[51]President of the Center for Analysis of Terrorism: https://www.cat-int.org/, acknowledges that it is with this jihadist women’s operational commando that the intelligence services and the justice system “understand at this moment [that they] had wrongly benefited from a gender bias” [free translation]^[52]« Comprennent à ce moment [qu’elles] ont bénéficié à tort d’un biais de genre ». D. Thomson, Les Revenants, Op.cit.. François Molin, the Republic’s attorney general, seems to discover that the Islamic State now uses women to lead its foreign operations and implies that this change only dates back to the summer of 2017^[53]“Selon François Molins, des femmes et des enfants sont appelées au “jihad armé””, SudOuest, 23/01/2018..

It took an attempted attack on its national territory for France to take women jihadists seriously and for a reflection to emerge within French intelligence, judicial and prison institutions. As a result, the criminal treatment changes: “While no woman was tried for terrorism between 2014 and 2015, 4 were tried in 2016, 15 in 2017 and 21 in 2018” [free translation]^[54]« Alors qu’aucune femme n’avait été jugée pour terrorisme en 2014 et 2015, 4 l’ont été en 2016, 15 en 2017 et 21 en 2018 ». L. Darbon, “Attentat raté de Notre-Dame: «Le rôle des … Continue reading. Post-Notre-Dame returnees are almost systematically imprisoned^[55]G. Casutt, “Quand le djihadiste est une femme”, 02/2018, Inflexions – Armée de terre, Op.cit., which means they can now meet in prison, create radicalisation centres, recruit, and plot further attacks. Regarding incarcerated men, the risks of radicalisation were taken into account ever since 1995, and the policy against radicalisation adopted in France in 2005 included a prison component. The French policy against radicalisation, until then exclusively focused on men and showing “gendered representations of religious risk” [free translation]^[56]« Représentations sexuées du risque religieux ». C. Béraud, C. Rostaing, C. de Galembert, “Genre et lutte contre la ‘radicalisation’. La gestion sexuée du ‘risque’ religieux en … Continue reading, needs to be adapted.

The return of jihadists wives and children is another sensitive issue. Since 2019, only the children of jihadists have been repatriated, even when the mother was alive and her location was known^[57]H. Radisson, “Familles de djihadistes français en Syrie: devant la CEDH, une audience attendue”, La Croix, 29/09/2021, … Continue reading. There has been a shift in France’s position, which now distinguishes between the child, an innocent victim born at the wrong place at the wrong time, and the mother, who made the choice to go to Syria to join Daesh and represents a potential threat. Unfortunately, leaving these women in the camps of Al-Hol and Roj^[58]Located in North-East Syria, in areas controlled by the Kurds. poses a security problem since they are creating radicalization centres and training the next generation of jihadists, the “cubs of the caliphate” [free translation]^[59]« Lionceaux du califat ». Expression used to refer to the children of jihadists. See: “175 parlementaires demandent le rapatriement des femmes et enfants français encore en Syrie”, … Continue reading.

Despite recent events, female jihadists are still treated differently based on their gender. Even today, it isn’t easy to establish a typical profile of the jihadist woman^[60]D. D. Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers, Op.cit.. And when the involvement of Western women in Daesh is discussed, the data is insufficient, and the approach is biased. The initial hypothesis in France is that the men and the women joining Daesh are not doing it for the same reasons, they are not recruited in the same way, etc… This hypothesis is unfounded since, in reality, there is no difference in recruiting methods^[61]Ibid., nor in the way, they are justifying the jihad and defending Daesh^[62]G. Casutt, “Quand le djihadiste est une femme”, 02/2018, Inflexions – Armée de terre, Op.cit., and not even in the difficulties they may encounter when it comes to giving it up^[63]D. Thomson, Les Revenants, Op.cit.. Yet, the three main reasons for women’s involvement are “love, humanitarianism and credulity” [free translation]^[64]« L’amour, l’humanitaire et la crédulité ». G. Casutt, “Quand le djihadiste est une femme”, 02/2018, Inflexions – Armée de terre, p. 89, Op.cit. This analysis excludes the political aspect of the involvement, the beliefs and the free will of these women^[65] Ibid. and contributes to “reducing the feminine jihad to a set of primarily emotional factors” [free translation]^[66]« à réduire le djihad féminin à un ensemble de facteurs avant tout émotionnels ». Ibid.. How can we explain that these motives, linked to character traits such as naivety and altruism, are only linked to women? And what about the women that left, fully knowing of the facts and who, once back in France, continue to adhere to the ideological discourse of Daesh?

Conclusion

Underestimating the dangerousness and religious and political beliefs of jihadist women is not the only evidence that the French intelligence services and justice system have internalized gender biases that affect their work and national security. It also points to a lag compared to other countries that are more aware of the development of the role of jihadist women (though largely documented) and more responsive to these issues.

Women and men jihadists pose an equal threat to France. They should therefore be treated the same by the justice system. It is likely that the lack of attention paid to women kamikazes until 2016 and the lack of anticipation have allowed some of them to slip through the net. In the future, Daesh’s theological and practical evolutions regarding its female members should be monitored more closely, more research should be conducted on why these women are pushing to join the terrorist group, and more credit should be given to these women, even if they are only women.

Sources :

• Ouvrages, rapports :

Thomson, Les Revenants, Editions Seuil, 2016, 294 pages.

D. Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers, 2004, 18 pages.

• Articles de presse :

“Combattants européens en Syrie: l’Europe prépare une réplique”, Le Monde avec AFP, 07/06/2013, https://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2013/06/07/jeunes-europeens-en-syrie-l-europe-prepare-une-replique_3426402_3218.html?xd_co_f=YjZjNWZiZjctODVkMi00NDdjLTgwMTMtZWQxMmQ2ZmMzMTI3#C6IRRbqGpCTkwBXr.99

“EN DIRECT – Attentat manqué de Notre-Dame : 25 et 30 ans de prison pour les deux principales accusées”, Le Figaro, 15/10/2019,

https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2019/10/14/01016-20191014LIVWWW00001-proces-attentat-rate-notre-dame-plaidoiries-verdict-terrorisme-islamisme.php

“Et la guérilla créa la femme-kamikaze”, Le Temps, 07/01/2016, https://www.letemps.ch/monde/guerilla-crea-femmekamikaze

Radisson, “Familles de djihadistes français en Syrie: devant la CEDH, une audience attendue”, La Croix, 29/09/2021, https://www.la-croix.com/France/Familles-djihadistes-francais-Syrie-devant-CEDH-audience-attendue-2021-09-29-1201177873

Darbon, “Attentat raté de Notre-Dame : «Le rôle des femmes djihadistes a été longtemps sous-estimé»”, FigaroVox, 23/09/2021, https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/societe/attentat-dejoue-de-notre-dame-le-role-des-femmes-djihadistes-a-ete-longtemps-sous-estime-20190923

“Selon François Molins, des femmes et des enfants sont appelées au “jihad armé””, SudOuest, 23/01/2018,

https://www.sudouest.fr/justice/terrorisme/selon-francois-molins-des-femmes-et-des-enfants-sont-appeles-au-jihad-arme-3189756.php

“Selon François Molins, la menace terroriste va rester élevée pendant plusieurs années”, Le Figaro, 23/01/2018, https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2018/01/23/01016-20180123ARTFIG00078-selon-francois-molins-la-menace-terroriste-va-rester-elevee-pendant-plusieurs-annees.php

“175 parlementaires demandent le rapatriement des femmes et enfants français encore en Syrie”, Libération, 04/10/2021. https://www.liberation.fr/societe/police-justice/175-parlementaires-demandent-le-rapatriement-des-femmes-et-enfants-francais-encore-en-syrie-20211004_RD4424SLGFENNMT3T4MZUN7KIU/

• Revues académiques et spécialisées :

Al-Rahman, “The Role of Women in Jihad by the martyred Shaykh, Al-Hafith Yusuf Bin Salih Al-‘Uyayri ”, U.A. 1429 AH (10 ou 11 Janvier 2008), Sada al-Malahim – the Jihad Base Organization in Southern Arabia, 17 pages, https://scholarship.tricolib.brynmawr.edu/bitstream/handle/10066/7287/HAF_Role_of_the_Women.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Uyayri, Al-Hafith Yusuf bin Salih al-’. « The Role Of The Women In Fighting The Enemies », 8 août 2011. https://scholarship.tricolib.brynmawr.edu/handle/10066/7287

Roblain, B. Malki, “Djihadistes, tous les mêmes ? Analyse psychosociale du profil des djihadistes européens et des problématiques sécuritaires qu’ils posent en Occident”, 01/2015, Journal du droit des jeunes, pages 38 à 42, https://www.cairn.info/revue-journal-du-droit-des-jeunes-2015-1-page-39.htm

Béraud, C. Rostaing, C. de Galembert, “Genre et lutte contre la ‘radicalisation’. La gestion sexuée du ‘risque’ religieux en prison”, 02/2017, Cahiers du Genre, pages 145 à 165

https://www.cairn.info/revue-cahiers-du-genre-2017-2-page-145.htm

Entretien avec Nelly Lahoud, “Les femmes dans la littérature et la pensée djihadiste”, Avril 2017, Confluences Méditerranée, pages 81 à 87, https://www.cairn.info/revue-confluences-mediterranee-2017-4-page-81.htm

Lahnait, “Femmes Kamikazes ou le Jihad au Féminin”, 04/2014, Tribune Libre – Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement, 14 pages.

Casutt, “Quand le djihadiste est une femme”, 02/2018, Inflexions – Armée de terre, pages 87 à 96, https://www.cairn.info/revue-inflexions-2018-2-page-87.htm

Abu Rumman, “Jihadist Woman: Role and Position Shift in Isis”, 2021, Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, https://www.abacademies.org/articles/jihadist-woman-role-and-position-shift-in-isis-10452.html

Bak, “Les femmes terroristes de Daech”, 22/10/2021, Institut du Genre en Géopolitique, https://igg-geo.org/?p=5232#f+5232+3+6

To cite this article: Laura Jbara-Le Gourrièrec, “When France would rather see jihadist women as victims”, 22.07.2022, Gender in Geopolitics Institute. 

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.